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Abstract: Article 12.4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.” Citizens clearly enjoy Article 12.4 rights, but this article
demonstrates that this right reaches beyond the citizenry. Using customary methods
of treaty interpretation, including reference to the ICCPR’s preparatory works and
the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, this article demonstrates that
Article 12.4 also forbids States from deporting long-term resident noncitizens—
both documented and undocumented—except under the rarest circumstances. As a
result, the ICCPR right to remain in one’s own country is a right that should be
particularly valuable to the many people in the world who have lived in, and
established a relationship with, a country which is not their country of citizenship—
including lawful permanent residents, long-term refugees, Dreamers and other
long-term undocumented residents, and people born in countries without birthright
citizenship. These people cannot be deported from the countries they call home.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 316
I.
THE INTERPRETATION OF ONE’S “OWN COUNTRY”.......... 318
A.
Customary Rules of Treaty Interpretation ............................. 319
B.
Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee .................... 327
II.
THE INTERPRETATION OF “ARBITRARILY” ......................... 336
A.
Customary Law of Treaty Interpretation ............................... 337
B.
Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee .................... 344
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “OWN COUNTRY” AND
“ARBITRARILY” ........................................................................... 354
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 355

*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law; M.B.A., Kelley
School of Business, Indiana University; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., University of Chicago. Please send
correspondence to the author at lynchte@umkc.edu. This article can be found at
http://ssrn.com/author=969133. This article is a revised and updated version of one section of an article by
the same author entitled The ICCPR, Non-Self-Execution, and DACA Recipients’ Right to Remain in the
United States, published in 2020 in the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal. 34 GEO. J. IMMIGR. L. 323
(2020).

316

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 31 NO. 3

INTRODUCTION
Article 12.4 of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) states, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.”1 Since the right to enter one’s own country necessarily
entails the right not to be deported, exiled, banished, or expelled2 from one’s
own country, Article 12.4 can be restated as providing that everyone has the
right to remain in their own country.3
It is readily assumed that such a right is enjoyed by a country’s citizens,
but customary rules of treaty interpretation demonstrate that this ICCPR right
extends beyond a nation’s citizenry. It is a right that is also enjoyed by
noncitizens who have strong attachments to a country. In fact, the scope of
Article 12.4 is so broad that it encompasses even undocumented noncitizens
who have such attachments.
However, the ICCPR does permit nonarbitrary expulsion.4 This raises
the question of how to distinguish between arbitrary expulsion and
nonarbitrary expulsion. To expel a citizen from their own country and prohibit
them from reentering is so far removed from modern societal norms that it is
hard to imagine what would qualify as a nonarbitrary expulsion.5 Expelling
noncitizens, however, is not far removed from current societal norms.
Expulsions of noncitizens may feel more acceptable6 and are, therefore, at first
blush, more likely to seem nonarbitrary. However, when anyone is removed
1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12.4, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. 92-908, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
2
Black’s Law Dictionary defines banishment and exile as synonyms. Exile, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Exile is defined as “[e]xpulsion from a country, esp. from the country of one’s
origin or longtime residence; banishment.” Id.
3
Numerous commentators have asserted the same. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment
27 on Freedom of Movement, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, ¶ 19 (1999) [hereinafter CCPR General
Comment 27] (Article 12.4 “implies the right to remain own’s country”); Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of
Views on Communication No. 538/1993, Stewart v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993, at 20 (Nov.
1, 1996) (dissenting opinion of Elizabeth Evatt & Cicilia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José
Aguilar Urbina) [hereinafter CCPR Stewart] (“If a State party is under an obligation to allow entry of a
person, it is prohibited from deporting that person.”); id. at 23 (dissenting opinion of Prafullachandra
Bhagwati) (“[A]rticle 12, paragraph 4, protects everyone against arbitrary deportation from his own
country…”). See also U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 954–59th mtgs., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.954–A/C.3/SR.959
(1959) (making it abundantly clear that the States negotiating the ICCPR contemplated that Article 12.4
would include a prohibition against expulsion (exile)); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)
(“[D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile…”).
4
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12.4.
5
In the United States, it is unconstitutional to banish American citizens since such banishments
violate the Constitution’s prohibition against the infliction of “cruel and unusual” treatment. Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958) (describing banishment as “a fate universally decried by civilized people”).
6
Indeed, we label the banishments of non-immigrants from their own countries with the less dramatic
words “deportation” and “removal.”
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from a country with which they have strong attachments, their removal results
in the loss of relationships, including perhaps the loss of a home, friends,
family, property, a professional career, and the like.7 That loss and pain can
be felt equally between citizens and noncitizens.
Customary rules of treaty interpretation show that “arbitrarily” as used
in Article 12.4 is actually an exceedingly strict standard. Only in extremely
rare cases may a State expel someone from their own country. This is true for
both citizens and noncitizens, and for both documented and undocumented
noncitizens.
As a result, the ICCPR right to remain in one’s own country is a right
that should prove to be particularly valuable to the many people in the world
who have lived in, and established a relationship with, a country which is not
their country of citizenship—including lawful permanent residents, long-term
refugees, Dreamers and other long-term undocumented residents, and people
born in countries without birthright citizenship. These people cannot be
deported from the countries they call home.
By using customary rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),8 and by referencing and
supporting the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee (which has
come to a similar set of conclusions), this article demonstrates the validity of
this interpretation of ICCPR Article 12.4. Again, Article 12.4 provides that
“[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”
The ambiguous terms in Article 12.4 that require interpretation are “his own
country” and “arbitrarily.” This article will interpret those terms. Specifically,
in Part I, this article interprets the phrase “own country” as it is used in Article
12.4. Part II interprets the word “arbitrarily.” Part III addresses the incorrect
suggestion that the interpretation of these two terms might be interrelated.
Before concluding this introduction, a few additional prefatory
comments are appropriate. First, this article will use the words “expulsion,”
“banishment,” and “exile” largely interchangeably.9 With regard to
noncitizens, the words “deportation” and “removal” will also be used. Second,
although normative arguments support some of the following analysis, this
7

Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (asserting that deportation can result in the “loss .
. . of all that makes life worth living”). Justice Frankfurter would repeat this lament three decades later.
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 350 (1954). See also Fong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 759 (1893) (Field,
J., dissenting) (“The punishment [of deportation] is beyond all reason in its severity. . . As to its cruelty,
nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s residence, and the breaking up of all the
relations of friendship, family and business there contracted.”).
8
United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
9
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2.
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article is primarily engaged in interpreting Article 12.4 of the ICCPR and is
not making a wholesale normative or moral argument for the right to remain.10
Third, Article 12.4 is binding only on those States who are parties to the
ICCPR (and who have not otherwise made a reservation regarding Article
12.4). The vast majority of the United Nations membership are States parties
to the ICCPR.11 When describing the international obligations States have
pursuant to Article 12.4, in order to avoid clumsy writing, this article will
often not expressly limit the scope of this obligation to the ICCPR States
parties, leaving it to the reader to imply this limitation. Fourth and finally, the
substance of much of the article can also be found in a previous work the
author published in 2020. That publication, however, focused on the plight of
DACA recipients and other Dreamers in the United States, and spent
considerable time expounding on the ostensible non-self-executing nature of
the ICCPR within the United States’ constitutional system.12 This article
updates and reshapes that discussion of Article 12.4 and repurposes it for an
international audience by stripping away most references to issues specific to
the United States and focusing solely on the interpretation of Article 12.4.
I.

THE INTERPRETATION OF ONE’S “OWN COUNTRY”

The ICCPR provision, “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country,”13 contains two terms that are ambiguous and
10

For moral arguments that jibe with the legal argument presented herein and the principles that
apparently animate the ICCPR, see Joseph H. Carens, Global Justice: Who Gets the Right Stay?, BOSTON
REV. (Jan. 23, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/global-justice/joseph-h-carens-who-gets-right-stay (“[T]he
moral right of states to apprehend and deport irregular migrants erodes with the passage of time” and
suggesting that a right to stay vests after only ten years); Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territoriality
and the Rights of Immigrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 389, 392, 405 (2007) (promoting the normative value
of “ethical territoriality,” the view that a person should have rights vis-à-vis the State by virtue of their
presence within that State’s territory, including, perhaps, on the basis their “lead[ing] a life” within the
territory, the right not to be deported; and asserting that “ethical territoriality honors the egalitarian and anticaste commitments to which liberal constitutionalism purports to aspire”); see generally JOSEPH H. CARENS,
IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY (2010); Elizabeth F. Cohen, Reconsidering US Immigration Reform:
The Temporal Principle of Citizenship, 9 PERSP. POL. 575 (2011).
11
As of the date of publication, there are 173 ICCPR States parties. ICCPR,
Accession, Succession, Ratification Table, UNITED NATIONS https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited May 9, 2022).
12
See Timothy E. Lynch, The ICCPR, Non-Self-Execution, and DACA Recipients’ Right to Remain in
the United States, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 324 (2020).
13
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12.4. There are no exceptions to this rule except for the ICCPR’s general
derogation provision, which can only be triggered “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of
the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.” Id. art. 4.1. Compare ICCPR, supra note 1,
art. 12.4 with G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR] (“Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.”).
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require interpretation. The first is “own country” (or “his own country”). The
second term is “arbitrarily.” To interpret these terms, we turn to the customary
rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the VCLT.
The customary methods of treaty interpretation, including examination
of the preparatory works, along with an examination of the jurisprudence of
the Human Rights Committee, strongly suggest that a country is someone’s
“own country” if their ties to that country are extensive and deep enough.
Consequently, a country can be a noncitizen’s own country (including even
when the noncitizen is undocumented).
A.

Customary Rules of Treaty Interpretation

The VCLT states that a treaty is to be interpreted “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”14 The VCLT permits
recourse to additional means of treaty interpretation if the application of the
primary treaty interpretation rule yields a meaning that is “ambiguous or
obscure” or “manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”15 Such supplemental means
of interpretation include analysis of the preparatory works associated with the
treaty’s negation and adoption.16
1.

Ordinary Meaning

The ordinary meaning of “country” is plain and requires no elaboration
here. The word “own” (or the phrase “his own”) is another matter.17 A relevant
definition of the word “own” is “of, relating to, or belonging to oneself or
itself (usually used after a possessive to emphasize the idea of ownership,

14

VCLT, supra note 8, art. 31.1.
Id. art. 32.
16
Id.
17
The Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish versions of the ICCPR are as “equally authentic” as the
English version. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 53.1. The Chinese version of Article 12.4 is “人人进入其本国之
15

权，不得无理褫夺.” The French, “Nul ne peut être arbitrairement privé du droit d'entrer dans son propre
pays.” The Russian, “Никто не может быть произвольно лишен права на въезд в свою собственную
страну.” And the Spanish, “Nadie podrá ser arbitrariamente privado del derecho a entrar en su propio país.”
See VCLT, supra note 8, art. 33.3 (“The terms of [a] treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each
authentic text.”); id. art. 33.4 (“[W]hen a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning
which the application of articles 31 and 32 [of the VCLT] does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.”). It is beyond the scope of
this article to independently interpret the non-English versions.
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interest, or relation conveyed by the possessive.)”18 This definition is rather
nebulous, and one runs the risk of engaging in confirmation bias when trying
to apply it, at least in the context of one’s “own country.” Nevertheless, some
initial observations can be made. First, one cannot possess a country like one
can possess a car or a house, of course, but a person can be “of” a country or
can have a “relationship to” a country or an “interest” in a country. Second,
there is nothing inherent in the word “own” (or “his own”) that would limit its
applicability to citizens of a country.
With regard to the ordinary meaning of the entire phrase “his own
country,”19 it would appear that the country of one’s citizenship qualifies as
an “own country” of that person. After all, the relationship of citizenship is a
strong one.20 But a country could also be one’s “own” if a person has strong
and intimate relationships to, or interests in, that country, especially if he or
she does not have such connections to another country. Factors to consider in
order to determine if a country is one’s “own” might include the length of
one’s residence, family connections, friends and other social ties, professional
relationships, professional credentials earned and recognized in the country,
ability to speak the language(s) of the country, acculturation in the country,
intention to remain in the country, and so on.21
2.

Context

Regarding the context of the phrase “his own country,” it is particularly
notable that Article 12.4 does not use the word “citizen” or “national.” It does
not speak of “the country of which he is a citizen” or “the country of which
he is a national.” Additionally, the subject of Article 12.4 is “no one”—not
18

Own, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/own (last visited May 9, 2022).
Merriam-Webster provides a similar definition: “belonging to oneself or itself.” Own, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/own (last visited May 9, 2022).
19
It is curious that Article 12.4 does not refer to “one’s country,” but rather refers to “one’s own
country.” However, there appears to be no relevant or substantive difference between the two phrases. Indeed,
there is nothing in the ordinary meaning or context of Article 12.4 or in the object and purpose or the
negotiating history of the ICCPR that would suggest that the insertion of “own” between “one’s” and
“country” was anything other than a reflection of natural English usage.
20
It seems wholly possible, however, that someone might not have any particularly intimate ties or
special links to the country of one’s citizenship such that that country would not constitute their “own
country” within the meaning of Article 12.4. However, this article is largely hostile to any possibility of
interpreting Article 12.4 in such a way that a person might not have the right to enter their country of
citizenship.
21
See Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Tae D. Johnson, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t., Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law (Sept. 30,
2021), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/guidelines-civilimmigrationlaw.pdf (stating that one of the
“mitigating factors” that might prevent the removal of someone from the United States is their “lengthy
presence in the United States”).

SPRING 2022

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN

321

“no citizen” or “no national.” Indeed, Article 12.4 conspicuously avoids the
terms “citizen” and “national.” The significance of these observations is
particularly strong since the ICCPR refers to “citizens” and “nationals” in
other provisions,22 strongly suggesting that the countries that adopted the
ICCPR did not intend to confine Article 12.4 rights to citizens (or nationals)
alone.
It might be argued that ICCPR Article 13 somehow limits the scope of
Article 12.4 to citizens alone. Article 13 states, “An alien lawfully in the
territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may be expelled therefrom
only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law. . .,” and
provides some other procedural safeguards.23 Some might argue that since the
ICCPR provides a process for expelling noncitizens (“aliens”), a noncitizen
cannot possibly have the right to remain in a host country.24 This conclusion,
however, is not dictated by Article 13 at all. Article 13 simply demands that
certain due process protections be applied before a country can expel a
noncitizen who is lawfully present in its territory, not that any and all
noncitizens can be expelled provided such protections are afforded.25
Noncitizens are entitled to these due process protections provided they are
“lawfully” within the country, and they are entitled to remain in their host
countries provided those host countries are, or have become, their own.26
Indeed, the process of providing due process protections should reveal facts
that could enable an administrative or judicial body considering expulsion to

22

E.g., ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 25(a) (granting the right to “take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives” only to citizens); id. art. 25(b) (granting the right “to vote
and to be elected” for public office only to citizens); id. art. 25(c) (granting “access… to public service” only
to citizens); id. art. 28(2) (limiting the composition of the Human Right Committee to “nationals” of States
parties); see also id. art. 29(2) (stating that persons nominated to the Human Rights Committee “shall be
nationals of the nominating State”); id. art. 31(1) (“The Committee may not include more than one national
of the same State.”).
23
Id. art. 13.
24
See, e.g., CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.3.
25
See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. of Guinea v. Dem. Rep. of Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep.
639, ¶ 65 (Nov. 2010) (“[I]t is clear that while ‘accordance with law’… is a necessary condition for
compliance with [art. 13], it is not the sufficient condition…[T]he applicable domestic law must itself be
compatible with the other requirements of the [ICCPR].”) [hereinafter ICJ Diallo].
26
But see CCPR Stewart, supra note 3 (arguing that an alien either qualifies for Article 12.4 treatment
or for Article 13 treatment, but never both). One concurrence and several dissenting opinions criticized this
approach, and it was later abandoned by the Human Rights Committee. See also infra notes 106–22 and
accompanying text.
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conclude that the host country has become that person’s own country.27 Such
a determination would foreclose the possibility of expulsion.28
3.

Object and Purpose

The interpretation of “his own country” must also be made “in light of
the object and purpose” of the ICCPR. Its object and purpose can be gleaned
from its preamble, which states that it is to enhance “freedom, justice and
peace in the world” through the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”29 These
rights are understood to “derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person.”30 More concretely, the object and purpose of the ICCPR is to restrict
States from impinging on the freedoms of human individuals and, in some
cases, to obligate States to provide certain services to people so that their
freedoms and dignity can be better realized.31 But this does not provide much
direct interpretive guidance since States are certainly free to act in a variety of
ways to restrict the human individual. The ICCPR does not render States
impotent.
However, given that the focus of the ICCPR is the protection of people,
typically in their capacity as human individuals, and the corresponding
restrictions on State behavior it demands, it would be reasonable, if not
incumbent, to interpret ambiguous terms and phrases within the ICCPR in a
way that favors the human individual and disfavors State restrictions on
freedoms of the human individual.32 As the Human Rights Committee’s
27

More precisely, only aliens “lawfully in the territory of a State Party” are entitled to due process
protections, whereas Article 12.4 applies to everyone, both lawfully present aliens and unlawfully present
ones. It might seem curious at first blush that unlawfully present aliens are not explicitly entitled to due
process protections but yet may be entitled to a more valuable right—the right to remain in a country.
However, the more valuable or fundamental a right, the more important it is to award to everyone. And,
regardless, an alien whose host country has become their own country is, by virtue of Article 12.4, lawfully
within the territory of the country.
28
Admittedly, there is no ICCPR provision that expressly requires due process rights be granted to
undocumented noncitizens who are undergoing deportation processes. This observation does not undermine
the fact that these individuals may have the right to remain in the country. And due process rights can be
found in other sources of law besides the ICCPR.
29
ICCPR, supra note 1, pmbl.
30
Id.
31
See generally Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 257 (1984); THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
32
The pro homine principle encourages the interpretation of human rights treaties that increases the
protection of the human person as opposed to interpretations that protect State sovereignty. Valerio de
Oliveira Mazzouli & Dilton Ribeiro, The Pro Homine Principle as an Enshrined Feature of International
Human Rights Law, 3 INDON. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 77 (2016). See also Asakusa v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S.
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Prafullachandra Bhagwati stated in his dissent in Stewart v. Canada, the
human rights in the ICCPR are “rights of the individual against the State; they
are protections against the State and they must therefore be construed broadly
and liberally.”33 If the answer to the question of whether a country can be a
noncitizen’s own country is somewhat uncertain even at this point in our
analysis, a broad and liberal interpretation of the ICCPR, one motivated for
the protection of the individual, must yield the answer: Yes, a country can be
a noncitizen’s own.34
4.

Preparatory Works

As stated earlier, the VCLT permits recourse to additional means of
treaty interpretation if the application of the primary method of treaty
interpretation yields a meaning that is “ambiguous or obscure” or “manifestly
absurd or unreasonable.”35 It may be fair to conclude that the answer to the
question of whether a noncitizen can enjoy Article 12.4 rights remains
somewhat ambiguous even after applying the primary methods of treaty
interpretation. And, indeed, it is likely that some people may consider it
manifestly absurd and/or unreasonable that noncitizens would be entitled to
332, 342 (1924) (“Treaties are to construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are
possible, one restrictive of rights which may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter is
to be preferred.”); Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 581 (1908) (“[T]reaties should be liberally
interpreted with a view to protecting the citizens of the representative countries in rights thereby secured.”).
It is a common response to such arguments that state “sovereignty” somehow militates against the
obligation of States to conform to international immigration laws, but it is the very nature of international
law, including international human rights and immigration law, to limit sovereign powers. The ICCPR is
international law, and its States parties are legally bound to adhere to its provisions. International law that
concerns immigration is not exempted. See Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization,
and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999). Indeed, many people have rights pursuant to
regional economic integration treaties to cross international frontiers into countries of which they are not
citizens, and arguments of “sovereignty” do not undermine these rights. See, e.g., Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 26, 45, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47;
Acuerdo sobre Regularización Migratoria Interna de Ciudadanos del Mercosur, Bolivia y Chile [Agreement
on Regularization of Internal Migration of Citizens of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile], Ley No. 3577 [Law No.
3577], 14-08-2008 (Para.); Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, 1
OFFICIAL J. ECOWAS 3 (1979).
33
CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, at 23.
34
See also Session v. Morales-Santana, 137 S.Ct. 1678, 1700 (2017) (citing Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S.
815, 834 (1971)) (recognizing in a case concerning citizenship requirements under the Immigration and
Nationality Act that Congress considers “the importance of residence in this country as the talisman of
dedicated attachment.”) (emphasis added); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II, 442 (1972) (“[I]t has never been envisioned that there should be any group of
underprivileged refugees, subject to the whims of the authorities… [A]s a state would not dream of expelling
its own nationals . . . there is hardly any reason for a state to press too hard for the expulsion of refugees [,
and, therefore,] after a period of some three years, the interests of the refugee in remaining where he is, must
normally be held to override any other consideration.”) (emphasis added).
35
VCLT, supra note 8, art. 32.
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maintain permanent residence in their host countries despite the host
countries’ wishes. (Certainly, others would see no absurdity or
unreasonableness in such an interpretation.) The use of additional means of
interpretation, therefore, seems wholly appropriate.36
The supplemental means of interpretation consist essentially of an
examination of the preparatory works (negotiation history or travaux
préparatoires)37 associated with the treaty’s negotiation and adoption and,
more generally, the circumstances of the text’s adoption.38 The preparatory
works of Article 12.4 confirm the interpretation above.
The ICCPR was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations
starting in the years immediately after World War II. It was heavily
negotiated, and its text was concluded in December 1966.39 The preparatory
works associated with Article 12.4 shed some light on its meaning. Most
significantly, in November 1959, a few days prior to the adoption of the
current form of Article 12.4, Canada, at a meeting of the Third Committee of
the General Assembly, formally proposed to amend the draft of the text of
what would become Article 12.4, suggesting language that no one could be
deprived of the right to enter “the country of which he is a citizen.”40 Such
36
The VCLT allows the use of additional interpretation methods in order to “confirm the meaning”
resulting from the application of the primary interpretation method. Id., art. 32. Thus, even if we were to
conclude that the meaning generated solely from the primary method of interpretation—here, at this point,
that noncitizens may enjoy Article 12.4 rights—is neither manifestly absurd, manifestly obscure, ambiguous
nor obscure, it is a worthwhile exercise to examine the preparatory works associated with Article 12.4 and
the circumstances of its negotiation.
37
It has been suggested that giving considerable weight to negotiation history in the context of a
multilateral treaty is somewhat problematic since not all treaty parties participate in the treaty negotiations
and because resort to legislative history is contrary to the legal traditions of many States. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325, note 1 (AM. L. INST. 1987). But see
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT’L COMM’N 233, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.1 (observing that States considering accession to a treaty have access to its travaux
préparatoires).
38
VCLT, supra note 8, art. 32.
39
Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&
clang=_en (last visited May 12, 2022).
40
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 954th mtg. at 231–32, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.954 (Nov. 12, 1959)
[hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.954]. The draft of Article 12 submitted for the General
Assembly’s consideration in November of 1959 was as follows:
1. Subject to any general law of the State concerned which provides for such reasonable restrictions as
may be necessary to protect national security, public safety, health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, consistent with the other rights recognized in this Covenant:
a. Everyone legally within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to
(i) liberty of movement and (ii) freedom to choose his residence;
b. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
2.
a. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary exile.
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language would clearly exclude noncitizens from the benefit of the right to
enter and to remain in their host countries. This proposal, however, was met
with relatively widespread opposition from other member States of the
committee.41
Some countries opposed granting the right of entry to citizens alone
because a State can manipulate who is, and who is not, a citizen. It was
observed that any State that wanted to exile a citizen could simply withdraw
citizenship and thus avoid the obligations of Article 12.4.42 Curiously, no State
proposed language that would limit the scope of Article 12.4 to citizens while
providing an exception in the event of State manipulation.
b.

Subject to the preceding sub-paragraph, anyone shall be free to enter his own country.

Draft Int’l Covenants on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/4299, ¶ 3 (Dec. 3, 1959).
There is abundant reason to conclude that the text of the language of Article 12.2.b. that was
introduced in 1959 to the General Assembly was adopted by early State drafting subcommittees to include
noncitizens. Ten years earlier, Lebanon first formally introduced the idea of including a right to return to a
country. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Draft Int’l Covenant on Hum. Rts., Lebanon:
Amends. to Art. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/215 (May 20, 1949) (proposing “… every one has the right… [t]o
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”). The Commission on Human Rights
would instead adopt a counter-proposal by France providing that “[e]veryone is free to return to the country
of which he is a national.” U.N. ESCOR, 5th Sess., 106th mtg. at 8–10, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/SR.106 (June 8,
1949). A year later, Australia proposed using the phrase “his own country.” U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Comments of Governments on the Draft Int’l Covenant on Hum. Rts. and Measures
of Implementation, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/353/Add.10 (Mar. 22, 1950); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Rep. on the Work of Its Sixth Session, at 23, U.N. Doc. E/1681 (May 25, 1950).
Australia argued that the right to return to a country should extend to people who “had established their home
in [a] country” or who “had long resided in a country and might be said to have settled there, although they
might still retain the nationality of some other country.” U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 151st mtg., ¶¶ 49, 52, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/SR.151 (Apr. 19, 1950). Australia’s amendment was rejected by a vote of seven to six with one
abstention. Id. ¶ 66. Australia persisted and two years later, in 1952, Australia proposed replacing “the
country of which he is a national” in the then-current version of what would become paragraph 2(b) above
with “his own country.” U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Draft Int’l Covenant on Hum.
Rts. and Measures of Implementation: Revised Amend. to Art. 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.189/Rev.1 (May 29,
1952). Australia argued that the right should extend to people who have a “permanent residence” in a country,
and the expressions “citizen” or “national” were inadequate to cover all such people. U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess.,
315th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.315 (May 29, 1952). This time the Commission on Human Rights
adopted Australia’s proposal by a vote of ten to two with six abstentions. U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., 316th mtg.
at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.316 (May 29, 1952). Thus, it was this eighth session of the Economic and Social
Council’s Commission on Human Rights that adopted the language reprinted above, the language that would
be submitted to the General Assembly in 1959 for its consideration. See also MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO
THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 260–
65 (1987).
41
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess. 957th. mtg. at 241, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.957, (Nov. 16, 1959)
[hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957].
42
See, e.g., ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.954, supra note 40, ¶ 35 (Summary Statement of Italy).
Framed another way, a State could choose who not to give citizenship to, thus denying those persons the
rights associated with citizenship. States have an almost unrestricted sovereign right to decide for themselves
who is and is not their citizens, despite the fact that such decisions may be discriminatory or ungenerous. See
generally Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694 (2011)
(acknowledging this fact but suggesting that it might be changing).
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After receiving only limited support, Canada withdrew its proposed
amendment.43 It is not apparent otherwise to what extent the negotiating States
contemplated or intended Article 12.4 to encompass noncitizens, let alone
undocumented noncitizens. Many States acknowledged that the language “his
own country” was vague.44 Of the sixty or so States that participated in these
negotiations, only four declared for the record, either after Canada withdrew
its proposal or in contemplation of such a withdrawal, that they understood
12.4 to be limited to either citizens or nationals: Canada,45 Czechoslovakia,46
Japan,47 and the United Kingdom.48 One State, Saudi Arabia, declared an
opposing sentiment, observing that “it would be dangerous to make the right
of everyone to enter his own country dependent on the fact of being a national.
To include that idea of being a national would open the way to arbitrary action
and help to increase the number of refugees.”49 No country remarked upon the
Saudi statement.50
Although an analysis of the preparatory works does not yield a perfectly
conclusive understanding of whether the negotiating countries intended the
43

ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 1 (Summary Statement of Canada).
E.g., id. ¶ 13 (Summary Statement of India); id. ¶ 19 (Summary Statement of the United Kingdom).
45
Id. ¶ 1 (Summary Statement of Canada,).
46
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 958th mtg. at 245, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.958 (Nov. 17, 1959)
[hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958] (Summary Statement of Czechoslovakia declaring that
Czechoslovakia understands Article 12.4 as articulating a right to enter a country “whose citizenship had
been bestowed upon the person in question in accordance with that State’s laws and regulations”).
Czechoslovakia’s statement seems distastefully self-serving, however, since it seems largely motivated by
Czechoslovakia’s desire not to be held liable to or for any of the 2.5 million ethnic Germans forcefully
expelled by Czechoslovakia from Czechoslovak territory in the immediate aftermath of World War II in an
Allied-sanctioned ethnic cleansing process that Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš referred to as “the
final solution of the German question.” Id. (“Those [Sudeten] Germans were not Czechoslovak citizens and
Czechoslovakia was not their own country.”). Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans were killed or died
from hunger, illness, and suicide during the expulsion campaigns in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Eastern
Europe. See generally R.M. DOUGLAS, ORDERLY AND HUMANE: THE EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS AFTER
THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2012).
47
U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 956th mtg. at 239, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.956, (Nov. 13, 1959)
[hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956] (Summary Statement of Japan declaring that Japan
understands Article 12.4 as articulating a right to enter a country of which a person is a “national”).
48
ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 19 (Summary Statement of the United
Kingdom). Additionally, the delegate from Pakistan stated that in order to take advantage of Article 12.4, a
person “should always be able to prove, in accordance with the law of the country concerned, that he was a
national of the country.” ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 47, ¶ 1 (Summary Statement of
Pakistan); ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.954, supra note 40, ¶ 36 (Summary Statement of Pakistan). The
delegate from Yugoslavia formally thanked Canada for withdrawing its amendment, which it considered
“superfluous.” ICCPR Preparatory Works, SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 7 (Summary Statement of Yugoslavia).
49
ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 25 (Summary Statement of Saudi Arabia).
50
Afghanistan formally thanked Canada for withdrawing its amendment since that amendment could
“give rise to restrictive interpretations.” Id. ¶ 15 (Summary Statement of Afghanistan). It is not evident what
Afghanistan was specifically contemplating. Italy also formally thanked Canada for withdrawing its
amendment. Id. ¶ 28 (Summary Statement of Italy). The United States delegate made no remarks about
whether Article 12.4 was or should be limited to citizens or nationals.
44
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scope of Article 12.4 to include noncitizens,51 the following observations are
warranted. First, an amendment to explicitly limit the scope of Article 12.4 to
citizens was roundly rejected. Second, the States parties knew that “his own
country” was vague and yet were comfortable enough to adopt this language.
These two observations alone strongly suggest that the right contained in
Article 12.4 is not limited to citizens (or nationals) of a State. And third, absent
a reservation, a State’s declared understanding made during the process of
negotiations of what a treaty provision should mean is not dispositive as to
that provision’s meaning, even regarding the provision’s application to that
particular State.
B.

Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee

The Human Rights Committee was established pursuant to the ICCPR52
and is tasked with evaluating the implementation of the ICCPR by the States
parties and with making general comments regarding the interpretation and
application of the ICCPR.53 Pursuant to the first Optional Protocol of the
ICCPR, several States parties have recognized the competency of the Human
Rights Committee to receive and consider complaints from individuals who
believe that one or more of their ICCPR rights are being, or are about to be,
violated by that State party.54
The States parties have not, however, designated the Human Rights
Committee as the authoritative interpretive body of the ICCPR. In fact, there
is no institution, judicial or otherwise, designated with the authority to
definitively interpret the ICCPR for all parties.55 Nevertheless, the Human
Rights Committee has interpreted and applied the ICCPR’s human rights
provisions far more than any other institution. Its reports, comments, and
adopted views are particularly considered and should inform our

51

For a discussion of how the debate on the inclusion of the word “arbitrarily” and the meaning of the
word “exile” shed some light on this issue, see infra Section II.A.4.
52
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 28.
53
Id. art. 40.4.
54
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. As of May 2022, 117 States have recognized this competency.
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited May 12, 2022).
55
For a discussion of which interpretive bodies have (and do not have) the authority to interpret
treaties, see Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 88 TEX. L. REV. 91, 95–97 (2009). See also
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE. L.J. 1762
(2009) (asserting that supranational bodies lack authority to definitively interpret treaties vis-à-vis the United
States).
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understanding of the meaning of the ICCPR.56 Ideally, all parties to the
ICCPR, as with any treaty, should understand and interpret the ICCPR
uniformly. The Human Rights Committee can be influential in bringing about
a harmonized understanding.57 Consequently, it is illuminating to see how the
Committee has interpreted and applied Article 12.4.
The Human Rights Committee has stated, unsurprisingly, that the
country of one’s nationality (or citizenship) qualifies as one’s “own
country.”58 But the Committee has invariably also stated that the phrase “his
own country” is “broader than the concept ‘country of his nationality.’”59 This
latter conclusion is based largely on the ordinary meaning of the text of Article
12.4,60 the fact that the provision is not expressly limited to “nationals,”61 and
the fact that the negotiating States in 1959 rejected Canada’s proposal to limit
reentry rights to citizens.62 The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly
elaborated upon its interpretation, saying that Article 12.4 “embraces, at the
very least, an individual who, because of his special ties to or claims in relation
56

See generally ICJ Diallo, supra note 25, ¶ 66 (asserting that the ICJ “should ascribe great weight”
to the interpretations adopted by the Human Rights Committee, in large part in order “to achieve the
necessary clarity and the essential consistency of international law”); Sandy Ghandhi, Human Rights and the
International Court of Justice: The Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case, 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 535, 527–55 (2011)
(acknowledging that although the Human Rights Committee’s General Comments “are not in themselves
strictly speaking binding … they constitute an authoritative guidance and interpretation of [the ICCPR]”).
57
United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was a proponent of uniform interpretation of
multilateral treaty provisions and respecting others’ reasonable interpretations. See Justice Antonin Scalia,
Sup. Ct. Justice, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute: Outsourcing American Law (Feb. 21, 2006).
58
E.g., CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶¶ 12.3–12.4 (stating that “his own country” “embraces” the
concept “country of his nationality” and that there is a set of people “in addition to nationals” that Article
12.4 protects); id. at 20 (dissenting opinion of Elizabeth Evatt and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by
Francisco José Aguilar Urbina) (“[A] person’s ‘own country’ would certainly include the country of
nationality…”); CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 20 (“The scope of ‘his own country’ is broader
than the concept ‘country of his nationality.’ It is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is,
nationality acquired at birth or by conferral.”); Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication
No. 2264/2013, Budlakoti v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/122/D/2264/2013, ¶ 9.2 (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter
CCPR Budlakoti]. Although the Human Rights Committee, in the context of Article 12.4, speaks of a person’s
“nationality” instead of person’s “citizenship,” it can be implied that nationality encompasses (or is at least
synonymous with) citizenship in this regard. See CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶¶ 19, 20
(asserting that Article 12.4 gives a person the right to enter the country that is the person’s “State of
nationality” even if that person had been born outside that country and had never been there before and noting
that like citizenship, nationality is “acquired at birth or by conferral”).
59
See, e.g., CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 20 (continuing that the scope of “his own
country” is “not limited to nationality in the formal sense, that is, nationality acquired at birth or by
conferral”); CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2; CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.3; Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Adoption of Views on Communication No. 1557/2007, Nystrom v. Australia, ¶ 7.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (July 18, 2011) [hereinafter CCPR Nystrom]; Human Rights Committee,
Adoption of Views on Communication No. 1559/2010, Warsame v. Canada, ¶ 8.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010 (Sept. 1, 2011) [hereinafter CCPR Warsame].
60
CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 20; CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.4.
61
CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 20; CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.4.
62
CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.5.
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to a given country cannot there be considered a mere alien.”63 The Committee
has repeatedly asserted that there are factors other than nationality which may
establish close and enduring connections between a person and a country,
connections that may be stronger than those of nationality. According to the
Committee, the words “his own country” invite consideration of such matters
as long-standing residence, close personal and family ties, and intention to
remain, as well as to the absence of such ties elsewhere.64
The Human Rights Committee has interpreted and applied Article 12.4
in response to six individual communications from noncitizens facing
deportation from their host States. In its most recent three cases, Nystrom v.
Australia (2011),65 Warsame v. Canada (2011),66 and Budlakoti v. Canada
(2018),67 the Committee deemed each of the countries in question to be the
noncitizen’s “own country” since the noncitizen’s personal ties to that country
were sufficiently strong.
In 2011, in Nystrom v. Australia, the Human Rights Committee
concluded that Australia was Stefan Lars Nystrom’s “own country” even
though Mr. Nystrom was not an Australian citizen.68 He was a Swedish citizen
and held an Australian permanent residency visa until the Australian
immigration authorities decided to deport him.69 Mr. Nystrom’s parents
immigrated to Australia from Sweden before he was born.70 While pregnant
with Mr. Nystrom, his mother visited Sweden and gave birth to him there,
returning to Australia with Mr. Nystrom when he was twenty-five days old.71
Mr. Nystrom had few ties to Sweden, never learned Swedish, and had not been
in direct contact with any family members there. He spent his whole life, apart
from his first twenty-five days, in Australia.72 He had close ties with his
mother, sister, and nephews in Australia.73 He was not married and had no
children.74 Neither he, nor his parents, had ever applied for Australian

63

See, e.g., id. ¶ 12.4; CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.4; CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.4;
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.2.
64
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.4; CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.4; CCPR Budlakoti, supra
note 58, ¶ 9.2; see also CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 20.
65
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59.
66
CCPR Warsame, supra note 59.
67
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58.
68
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.5.
69
Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.2, 2.4. In fact, pursuant to the terms of his visa, one called an “Absorbed Persons Visa,”
he was allowed to vote and run for local elective office. Id. ¶ 3.3.
70
Id. ¶ 2.1.
71
Id.
72
Id. ¶ 2.2.
73
Id. His parents divorced when he was five, and he had not been in much contact with his father.
74
Id. at 22, ¶ 2.3 (dissenting opinion of Gerald L. Neuman and Yuji Iwasawa).
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citizenship.75 He was thirty-one years old when Australia first issued a
deportation order against him.76 Because of his cultural, social, and familial
ties to Australia and his lack of personal relationships anywhere else, the
Human Rights Committee deemed Australia to be Mr. Nystrom’s “own
country” as that phrase is used in Article 12.4 of the ICCPR.77 As such,
Australia was prohibited under the terms of the ICCPR from arbitrarily
expelling him.78
Also in 2011, in Warsame v. Canada, the Human Rights Committee
concluded that Canada was Jama Warsame’s “own country” even though Mr.
Warsame was not a Canadian citizen.79 He was born in Saudi Arabia to Somali
parents.80 He did not have Saudi citizenship, Somali citizenship, or any other
citizenship.81 He came to Canada with his parents at age four and received
permanent residency status at age eight as a dependent of his mother.82 He
was raised in Canada and had limited ability in the language of his parents.83
He claimed to have close relationships with his mother and sister in Canada.84
He was not married and had no children.85 He apparently never applied for
Canadian citizenship.86 He was twenty-two years old when he received his
first deportation order.87 Because of his cultural, social, and familial ties to
Canada, and his lack of personal relationships anywhere else, the Human
Rights Committee deemed Canada to be Mr. Warsame’s “own country” as
that phrase is used in Article 12.4 of the ICCPR.88 As such, Canada was
prohibited from arbitrarily expelling him.89

75

Id. ¶¶ 2.6, 4.9. He claimed that he had always assumed he was an Australian citizen and that he only
learned otherwise at age twenty-nine when the State brought up the possibility of canceling his visa. Id. ¶
2.6.
76
Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.4. Australia decided to deport him because of his extensive criminal activity. For a
discussion of his crimes and Australia’s decision to deport him, see infra Section II.B.1.
77
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶¶ 7.4–7.5.
78
For a discussion of the meaning of “arbitrarily” as used in ICCPR Article 12.4 and the Human Rights
Committee’s decision regarding Nystrom, see infra Part II.
79
CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.5.
80
Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 8.5. The Canadian authorities assumed that Somalia would recognize him as a citizen as
soon as he applied, even though he had not been registered in Somalia and had never been to Somalia. Id.
81
Id. ¶¶ 4.2, 4.4.
82
Id. ¶ 2.2.
83
Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 4.4, 8.5.
84
CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶¶ 3.6, 5.10.
85
Id. ¶ 4.9.
86
Id. ¶ 6.6.
87
Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 2.3. Canada decided to deport him because of his extensive criminal activity. For a
discussion of his crimes and Canada’s decision to deport him, see infra Section II.B.1.
88
CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶¶ 8.4–8.5.
89
For a discussion of the meaning of “arbitrarily” as used in ICCPR Article 12.4 and the Human Rights
Committee’s decision regarding Warsame, see infra Part II.
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Most recently, the Human Rights Committee concluded in 2018 in
Budlakoti v. Canada that Canada was Deepan Budlakoti’s “own country”
even though Mr. Budlakoti was not a Canadian citizen.90 He was born in
Canada to Indian parents who had arrived in Canada four years earlier on
diplomatic passports to work as domestic servants for Indian diplomats.91 He
lived in Canada his whole life, always considered himself Canadian, and
believed he was a Canadian citizen.92 His parents eventually became Canadian
citizens, but formally, Mr. Budlakoti only had permanent residency status
under Canadian immigration law.93 Mr. Budlakoti had a younger brother who
was a Canadian citizen by birth.94 Mr. Budlakoti appears to have been largely
estranged from his family, having left home at age thirteen,95 and at times he
had been a ward of the State.96 He had no spouse and no children.97 For a brief
period of time, he had a small construction business that he started at age
nineteen.98 He had visited India only once, for two weeks, when he was
eleven.99 He was not proficient in any Indian language and claimed not to be
familiar with any Indian culture or with any Indian customs.100 India did not
recognize him as a citizen.101 He was twenty-two years old when Canada
issued its first deportation order against him.102 Because of his cultural, social
and familial ties to Canada, and his lack of personal relationships anywhere
else, the Human Rights Committee determined Canada was Mr. Budlakoti’s
“own country” as that phrase is used in Article 12.4 of the ICCPR.103 As such,
Canada was prohibited from arbitrarily expelling him.104
It is worth noting that Misters Nystrom, Warsame, and Budlakoti each
either lawfully entered his respective country or was born to parents who were
90

CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶¶ 9.2–9.3.
Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 9.3. Canada normally recognizes everyone born in the territory of Canada as a Canadian
citizen. However, Mr. Budlakoti fell into one of the exceptions. Pursuant to Canadian citizenship law, he was
not a Canadian citizen because his parents were in Canada in a diplomatic status. See id. ¶ 4.14.
92
Id. ¶¶ 2.1, 9.3. In fact, the Canadian passport authorities issued him a Canadian passport,
erroneously, when he was 13 years old based on his birth certificate. See id. ¶ 2.4. Based in part on his
misunderstanding, he never applied for citizenship. See id. ¶¶ 2.4, 4.4.
93
Id. ¶¶ 2.4, 4.4.
94
Id. ¶ 2.3.
95
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 4.16.
96
Id. ¶ 5.3.
97
Id. ¶ 4.4.
98
Id. ¶ 3.1.
99
Id. ¶¶ 3.1, 9.3.
100
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58.
101
Id. ¶¶ 5.3, 6.2.
102
Id. ¶¶ 1.1, 2.6. Canada decided to deport him because of his extensive criminal activity. For a
discussion of Mr. Budlakoti’s crimes and Canada’s decision to deport him, see infra Section II.B.1.
103
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶¶ 9.2–9.3.
104
For a discussion of the meaning of “arbitrarily” as used in ICCPR Article 12.4 and the Human Rights
Committee’s decision regarding Budlakoti, see infra Part II.
91
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lawfully in the country. However, the Human Rights Committee’s evaluation
of the factors that led it to conclude that each man was within his own country
never included the fact that they were lawfully admitted into the country or
born in the country to parents who had been lawfully admitted.105 The
Committee’s analysis focused on the number, strength, and nature of ties—
familial, social, cultural, linguistic, and professional—each person had to the
relevant country. The circumstances and legality of their initial entry were
irrelevant.
It is also worth noting that, with these three cases, the Human Rights
Committee abandoned an earlier exception to the principle that a country can
be one’s “own country” based solely on that person’s ties to that country. This
exception can be termed the Stewart doctrine, after Stewart v. Canada,106 the
first case in which the Committee interpreted Article 12.4 in the context of an
attempted deportation of a noncitizen.
Like Misters Nystrom, Warsame, and Budlakoti, Charles Stewart had
lived nearly all his life in a country, Canada, which was not the country of his
citizenship. He was a British citizen who had lawfully entered Canada with
his family when he was seven years old and lived in Canada until being
deported almost three decades later.107 He had been married to a Canadian
woman and had two young children, both of whom had been born in Canada
and were Canadian citizens.108 Except for an older brother who had previously
been deported, all of his closest relatives lived in Canada.109 He had never
applied for citizenship.110 Mr. Stewart was facing deportation as a result of his
criminal activity.111 Despite Mr. Stewart’s strong personal ties to Canada, and
despite his lack of extensive ties to any other country, the Human Rights
Committee concluded that Canada was not Mr. Stewart’s “own country” for
the simple—and perplexing—reason that Mr. Stewart had not attempted to
acquire Canadian citizenship.112
105

Granted, in none of these cases did the Human Rights Committee have to wrestle with a situation in
which the child entered unlawfully or was born to parents who were present unlawfully; thus it is not
surprising that the Committee did not expressly highlight this or wrestle with a hypothetical opposite
situation. CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶¶ 2.1–2.4; CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 2.1; CCPR Warsame,
supra note 59, ¶ 2.2. But see infra Section II.B.2 (discussing this situation).
106
CCPR Stewart, supra note 3.
107
Id. ¶ 2.1, 2.2.
108
Id. ¶ 2.1.
109
Id.
110
CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 2.2. Stewart claimed that he believed that he was a Canadian citizen
until it was discovered during a criminal prosecution that he was not. Id.
111
Id. ¶ 2.4
112
Id. ¶¶ 12.2–12.9. The Human Rights Committee in Stewart concluded that citizens of a country, of
course, could call the country of their citizenship their own, but noncitizens rarely could. The Stewart
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The Stewart majority justified this narrow interpretation on the
assertion that if a noncitizen had lived in country for so many years, as Mr.
Stewart had done with Canada, that country had a “right” to expect the
noncitizen to apply for citizenship and be burdened with all the obligations of
citizenship.113 Since Mr. Stewart had not applied, Canada could not be deemed
his own country. The fact that any citizenship application Mr. Stewart might
have submitted would likely have been denied on account of his criminal
record did not trouble the Stewart majority since such “disability was of his
own making.”114
There seems to be nothing in the language, context, or preparatory work
of Article 12.4 that allows for this Stewart exception. Additionally, there is a
deep internal tension in the Human Rights Committee’s reasoning in Stewart.
According to the Stewart exception, it is the length of time that a noncitizen
has been in a country that warrants that country’s “right” to expect that
majority listed some examples of noncitizens it would include within the scope of Article 12.4. These
examples were the following: (i) “nationals of a country who have there be [sic] stripped of their nationality
in violation of international law;” (ii) “individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated into
or transferred to another national entity whose nationality is being denied them;” and (iii) “stateless persons
arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence.” CCPR Stewart,
supra note 3, ¶ 12.4. Although it is abundantly clear that this list was merely illustrative and non-exhaustive—
and, indeed, it is a list of situations to which the application of Article 12.4 seems wholly unobjectionable—
a handful of committee members in Nystrom and Warsame, cases examined fifteen years later, would cling
to the Stewart interpretation, and strongly suggest that this Stewart list comprised the only categories of
noncitizens who enjoy Article 12.4 rights. E.g., CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, at 25 (dissenting opinion of
Sir Nigel Rodley, Helen Keller, and Michael O’Flaherty); CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, at 22 (individual
opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley). Notably, the Nystrom and Warsame committee members who seem to suggest
that this list is exhaustive were nationals of developed, immigrant-receiving States—Helen Keller
(Switzerland); Gerald Newman (United States); Michael O’Flaherty (Ireland); Yuji Iwasawa (Japan); Nigel
Rodley (UK); and Kirster Thelin (Sweden). For the committee members and their nationalities, see Hum.
Rts. Comm., Rep. on the Work of Its 100th Session, 101st Session, 102nd Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/40, at
232 (2011). In the recently decided Budlakoti case, however, not a single committee member who
participated in the examination of Mr. Budlakoti’s communication—including the participating committee
members from immigrant-receiving States (e.g., France, Israel, Italy, South Africa, and the United States)—
maintained the limited interpretation of Article 12.4 asserted by the Stewart majority. CCPR Budlakoti, supra
note 58. For the committee members and their nationalities, see Hum. Rts. Comm., Rep. on the Work of Its
120th Session, 121st Session, 122nd Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/40, at 13 (2018). See also CCPR General
Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 20 (making it clear that other factors besides those listed in Stewart “may in
certain circumstances result in the establishment of close and enduring connections between a person and a
country”).
113
CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.8 (“Countries like Canada, which enable immigrants to become
nationals after a reasonable period of residence, have a right to expect that such immigrants will in due course
acquire all the rights and assume all the obligations that nationality entails. Individuals who do not take
advantage of this opportunity and thus escape the obligations nationality imposes can be deemed to have
opted to remain aliens in Canada. They have every right to do so but must also bear the consequences….
Individuals in these situations must be distinguished from the categories of persons described in [Article
12.4].”).
114
CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.6. The fact that Mr. Stewart thought for so long that he was a
Canadian citizen and thus would have no need to apply for Canadian naturalization likewise did not concern
the Stewart majority. Id. ¶ 2.2.
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noncitizen to apply for and, presumably, receive citizenship—but that same
length of time and the presumed eligibility to obtain citizenship is not in itself
enough to qualify that same country to be that noncitizen’s own. For some
reason, the noncitizen must take the administrative steps necessary to apply
for and receive citizenship in order to enjoy the right not to be exiled as
provided in Article 12.4.115 This appears to be contrary to the Committee’s
repeated assertions elsewhere that Article 12.4 can be enjoyed by both citizens
and noncitizens.116
As stated above, the Stewart majority seemed to justify this conclusion
on the belief that long-term noncitizens are somehow escaping the obligations
of citizenship. The Stewart majority, however, does not state what those
obligations are. Indeed, it is challenging to think of a list of obligations that
are not only triggered only after one becomes a citizen117 but are also so
burdensome that they serve as the quid pro quo for the right not to be banished
from your own country.
The Stewart doctrine can lead to patently absurd results. Consider
someone like the real-life Marguerite Grimmond, a woman who was born in
the United States but moved to Scotland at age two with her Scottish mother
and lived in the United Kingdom for the following seventy-eight years without
acquiring British citizenship and without receiving explicit permission from
the British government to stay. In 2007, upon returning to the United Kingdom
from her first overseas trip at age eighty, she was told by British immigration
authorities that she would be deported and had to leave the United Kingdom
within four weeks.118 Since she had never applied for citizenship (and thus
115

The Human Rights Committee acknowledged that there would be an exception when the host
country placed “unreasonable impediments on the acquiring of nationality.” CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶
12.5. But see id. at 23 (dissenting opinion of Prafullachandra Bhagwati) (objecting generally to the narrow
interpretation of the majority arguing, in part, that “it is the sovereign right of a State to determine under what
conditions it will grant nationality to a non-national. It is not for the Committee to pass judgment whether
the conditions are reasonable or not….”).
116
See sources cited supra note 59.
117
Possible obligations include an obligation of national service (including registering for such
service), the obligation to pay taxes on income earned while living and working abroad, and/or the obligation
to make oneself available for jury duty. But see 50 U.S.C. § 3802 (requiring “every male citizen of the United
States[] and every other male person residing in the United States” (except for lawfully present
nonimmigrants) to register for the draft) (emphasis added); Who Needs to Register, U.S. SELECTIVE SERV.
SYSTEM, https://www.sss.gov/Registration-Info/Who-Registration (last visited May 9, 2022) (explaining the
requirement that male immigrants register for the draft); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 519, U.S.
TAX GUIDE FOR ALIENS, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p519.pdf (last visited (May 9, 2022) (requiring
resident aliens to pay foreign earned income tax).
118
Pensioner Wins Deportation Fight, BBC NEWS (June 20, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_
news/scotland/tayside_and_central/6223440.stm. After eventually receiving authorization to stay, Mrs.
Grimmond reportedly said, “I was trying to put a brave face on things, but I was a bit churned up inside at
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never “incurred the obligations of citizenship”), pursuant to the Stewart
doctrine the United Kingdom would not be her “own country.” Presumably,
she would easily qualify for citizenship, but for whatever reason, she did not
apply. Perhaps it never seemed important to her because she was British in
every sense that mattered in her life. Perhaps she lacked the sophistication or
the inclination to apply. Perhaps she did not know she was not a citizen. Given
that Article 12.4 is not expressly limited to citizens, it is extraordinarily
difficult to see how the United Kingdom was not Mrs. Grimmond’s own
country for purposes of that provision.119
For these and other reasons, the Stewart majority’s interpretation of “his
own country” triggered vigorous dissenting individual opinions by six
Committee members.120 The Stewart doctrine was applied by Human Rights
Committee majorities in two later cases121 before being abandoned,
the thought that I might have to move to America because I don’t know anyone there … I know the weather
is better across there, but I am quite happy here in rainy old Scotland, and it is nice to know I am here legally
at long last.” Id. Mrs. Grimmond also would not have met any of the three exceptions articulated in Stewart.
See CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, ¶ 12.4; supra note 112.
119
In this case, Mrs. Grimmond can claim two countries as “her own” as result of her relationships with
them. The United States is her own country by virtue of her citizenship relationship with it, and the United
Kingdom is her own country by virtue of her other personal relationships with that country. There is nothing
within Article 12.4 that limits a person to only having one country they can call their own, and those with
dual (or more) citizenships would have more than one own country. See also CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, at
23 (dissenting opinion of Prafullachandra Bhagwati) (“It is quite conceivable that an individual may have
two counties which he can call his own: one may be a country of his nationality and the other, a country
adopted by him as his own country.”).
120
See, e.g., CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, at 20 (dissenting opinion of Elizabeth Evatt and Cecilia
Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José Aguilar Urbina) (“For the rights set forth in Article 12, the
existence of a formal link to the State is irrelevant; the Covenant is here concerned with the strong personal
and emotional links an individual may have with the territory where he lives and with the social circumstances
obtaining in it. This is what Article 12, paragraph 4, protects.”); id. at 23 (dissenting opinion of
Prafullachandra Bhagwati) (arguing that the consequence of not becoming a citizen cannot be the forfeiture
of an ICCPR right, and observing, “it is because the author is not a Canadian national that the question has
arisen[,] and it is begging the question to say that Canada could not be regarded as ‘his own country’ because
he did not or could not acquire Canadian nationality.”); id. at 18 (concurring opinion of Laurel B. Francis)
(opining that Canada, at some point in time, had been Mr. Stewart’s “own country”). Manfred Nowak, a
scholar who served as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture from 2004 to 2010, referred to the Stewart
rationale as “controversial” and “unfortunate” and characterized the dissenting opinions as “more
convincing.” MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY,
285–86, (2d ed. 2005).
121
Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 558/1993, Canepa v. Canada, at 9,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 (Apr. 3, 1997) () [hereinafter CCPR Canepa] (citing Stewart in denying
Article 12.4 rights to a 23-year-old Italian citizen who had lived in Canada continuously since the age of five
since he had not applied for Canadian citizenship and was otherwise ineligible for Canadian citizenship on
account of his criminality); Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 1011/2001,
Madafferi v. Australia, at 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (July 26, 2004) [hereinafter CCPR
Madafferi] (citing Stewart in denying Article 12.4 rights to a 40-year-old Italian citizen who had lived in
Australia for the previous eleven years, had an Australian citizen wife and four Australian citizen children,
had siblings in Australia, and had his own retail business, since he had not applied for Australian
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justifiedly, afterwards.122
II.

THE INTERPRETATION OF “ARBITRARILY”

Recall that the full text of Article 12.4 reads, “No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”123 Therefore, a
State is permitted to nonarbitrarily deprive someone of their right to enter their
own country, or, by extension, expel someone from their own country, thus
raising the question of what “arbitrarily” means within the context of Article
12.4.
The customary method of treaty interpretation, along with an analysis
of the ICCPR’s preparatory works and the jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee, clearly establish that the word “arbitrarily” in Article 12.4 has an
extremely broad scope, which is to say, that opportunities for nonarbitrary
banishment are exceedingly rare. Indeed, even a concern for national security,
citizenship—having assumed incorrectly that marrying an Australian citizen made him an Australian
citizen—and, after deportation proceedings commenced, was rejected for Australian citizenship on account
of his criminality as a younger man in Italy). The Canepa opinion triggered several dissenting opinions, some
citing to their earlier dissents in Stewart. CCPR Canepa, supra note 121, at 11 (dissenting opinion of
Elizabeth Evatt and Cecelia Medina Quiroga); id. at 10 (concurring opinion of Martin Scheinin); id. at 12
(dissenting opinion of Christine Chanet) (“The deliberate use of [the] vaguer and hence broader term [“his
own country”] indicates that the drafters of the Covenant did not wish to limit the scope of the text in the
manner decided by the Committee.”).
122
In each of these three later cases, Budlakoti, Nystrom, and Warsame, none of the noncitizens who
were the subjects of deportation proceedings sought citizenship. And if they had, it appears likely that each
would have been denied because of their extensive criminal records.
The Human Rights Committee also employed ICCPR Article 12.4 in a case in 2000 to help it decide
whether New Zealand had withdrawn citizenship from five Western Samoans in violation of the ICCPR.
Although the communication’s Samoan authors did not explicitly make a claim that New Zealand had
violated Article 12.4, the Committee concluded that at the time of the withdrawal New Zealand was not any
of the authors’ “own country” as understood in Article 12.4, and, hence, the withdrawal of their citizenship
and subsequent deportation did not violate the ICCPR. At the time of the withdrawal, the authors were in
their 50s and 60s, had never lived in New Zealand, and did not even know that they had had New Zealand
citizenship. In fact, by the time of withdrawal, only one of the authors had even set foot in New Zealand, and
that was for a short-term visit. Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 675/1995,
Toala v. New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/63/D/675/1995 (Nov. 2, 2000). Curiously, the Human Rights
Committee received several individual communications that did not charge a State party with a violation of
Article 12.4 but whose underlying facts suggest that the authors, who were all noncitizens challenging the
right of their host countries to deport them, would have had more than plausible, if not winning, Article 12.4
claims. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 1792/2008, Dauphin v.
Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1792/2008 (July 28, 2009) (describing the author as a 22-year-old Haitian
citizen without significant links to Haiti who lawfully came to Canada at age two with his family and
otherwise lived all his life in Canada, most of the while assuming he was a Canadian citizen); Hum. Rts.
Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 2387/2014, A.B. v. Canada, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/117/D/2387/2014 (July 15, 2016) [hereinafter CCPR A.B.] (describing the author as a 37-year-old
Somali citizen who fled Somalia at age eleven and arrived in Canada at age thirteen with his mother where
he was recognized as refugee and given permanent residency).
123
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12.4 (emphasis added).
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public order, or public health would not necessarily entitle a State to banish
someone from their own country. This interpretation also strongly suggests
that it would be arbitrary to banish a noncitizen merely because that person
had entered the country, or stayed in the country, without explicit permission
from the State government.
A.

Customary Law of Treaty Interpretation
1.

Ordinary Meaning

There are many dictionary definitions of “arbitrary.” Two from the
online Oxford English Dictionary that plausibly fit the context of Article 12.4
are as follows: “Derived from mere opinion or preference; not based on the
nature of things; hence, capricious, uncertain, varying” and “Unrestrained in
the exercise of will; of uncontrolled power or authority, absolute; hence,
despotic, tyrannical.”124 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “arbitrary” with
regard to judicial decisions as “founded on prejudice or preference rather than
on reason or fact.”125 Each of these definitions would appear to grant a State
considerable latitude in choosing whether to deprive someone of their right to
enter their country or to expel someone from the country. Under these
definitions, for example, it may not be “arbitrary” to banish someone based
on a law that provides that all citizen criminals can be banished. However, the
context of the word’s use, along with the object and purpose of the ICCPR
and the negotiating history of Article 22.4, strongly points in the opposite
direction.
2.

Context

The context of the use of the word “arbitrarily” strongly suggests that
States do not have broad latitude to prevent someone from entering their own
country or to banish someone from their own country. The word “arbitrarily”
is used in the context of a prohibition against banishment. Because of the
extremely harsh nature of banishment,126 one should assume that a human
rights instrument would permit banishment under only the rarest
circumstances, and thus a State must have a compelling reason for banishing
124

Arbitrary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/10180 (last
visited May 9, 2022).
125
Arbitrary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
126
See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 (describing banishment as “a fate universally decried by civilized
people”).
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someone for the banishment not to be “arbitrary.” Certainly, the ICCPR would
not permit a country to banish a citizen merely because it was done pursuant
to some black letter law or based on some articulable facts.
The broader context of Article 12.4 within the ICCPR also sheds some
light on the interpretation of the word “arbitrarily.” Article 12 contains the
treaty’s free movement provisions. Article 12.1 provides for freedom of
movement within a country and the freedom to choose one’s residence.127
Article 12.2 provides for the freedom to leave countries.128 Of all these
movement rights, the right not to be denied entry to one’s own country—
including the right not to be banished—is not only the most valuable but also
the least likely to be restricted. In fact, States rarely, if ever, banish citizens in
the twenty-first century. It is primitive, unjust, and unnecessary. Meanwhile,
however, States often restrict internal movements, including the freedom to
choose one’s residence (e.g., exclusions from private or government property,
exclusions from dangerous places, incarceration, zoning ordinances) and
often restrict people from leaving the country (e.g., incarceration, parole
restrictions).
The remaining Article 12 provision, Article 12.3, provides that these
three other freedom of movement provisions—the freedom of internal
movement, the freedom to choose one’s residence, and the freedom to leave
any country—can be restricted under the following conditions: the restrictions
must be provided by law, must be “consistent with other rights recognized in
the [ICCPR],” and must be “necessary to protect national security, public
order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others.”129 Those conditions are very strict.
The right to enter one’s country, however, is not subject to the
exceptions listed in Article 12.3. A State can deprive someone of the right to
enter their own country if such deprivation is not “arbitrary,” thus suggesting
that this freedom may be permissibly restricted either more readily or less
readily than a State may restrict the other movement freedoms. Since the right
to enter one’s country seems like a much more valuable right, and one that is
rarely, if ever, denied (as to citizens, at least), the restriction on States that
prohibits them from preventing people from entering their own countries must
be more absolute than the restrictions on the deprivations of the other

127
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12.1. (“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that
territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.”).
128
Id. art. 12.2 (“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”).
129
Id. art. 12.3.
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movement freedoms.130 In other words, the deprivation of the right to enter
one’s own country can be arbitrary even if the State were to deem such
deprivation necessary to protect national security, public order, public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Therefore, “arbitrarily” must
have a particularly broad meaning, one that would capture nearly all State
actions that deprive a person of the right to enter their own State.131
3.

Object and Purpose

The object and purpose of the ICCPR also point in the direction of this
interpretation since, as discussed above,132 we should interpret ambiguous
terms and phrases within the ICCPR in a way that favors the human individual
and disfavors State restrictions.
Given all of this, “arbitrarily” in the context of Article 12.4 would seem
to include not just notions of reasonableness but also notions of strict
proportionality and utter necessity. Having articulable “reasons” to expel is
not enough. In order for someone’s banishment to be nonarbitrary, the
achievement of a State goal that results from the banishment must be
important enough so as to be proportionate to the great harm that banishment

130

But see, e.g., Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 6th Sess., 151st mtg., supra note 40, at 10 (summarizing the
American representative’s characterization of banishment as a lesser deprivation because “a person deprived
of the right to return to the country of which he was a national has, after all, the rest of the world in which to
move and choose a residence, whereas a person deprived of the right of liberty of movement of choosing his
residence within the borders of a State and of leaving his own, was in a far more serious predicament”). This
view downplays the hardship imposed on an individual who has no strong ties in another country, and
furthermore, it is not always the case that someone facing deportation has a country of citizenship. See, e.g.,
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.4; CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.6.
131
The word “arbitrarily” is used in three other provisions of the ICCPR. For a discussion of these
provisions and a discussion of the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of each, see infra note 159. It
might be assumed that the word means the same thing in each provision, and, if so, it would be necessary to
do an interpretation of the word in each context and then triangulate into the “correct” definition. However,
based on the discussions concerning Article 12.4 by the negotiating States, there is no reason to think that
they considered all other uses of the word in the rest of the ICCPR nor that they consciously intended that
the word have the exact same meaning in each case. In the General Assembly’s four-day negotiation leading
to the adoption of the language of Article 12, there were only three comments regarding the fact that the word
“arbitrarily” is used elsewhere in the ICCPR, and those comments were generally unremarkable and
generated no further discussion. ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 46, at 246–48 (Summary
Statement of the Philippines); id. ¶ 25 (Summary Statement of Panama); id. ¶ 31 (Summary Statement of
Ireland). In fact, Ireland’s comment suggests that the interpretation of “arbitrary” in Article 12.4 might be
different from the interpretations of “arbitrary” in Articles 6 and 9 since “the meaning of the wording [in
Articles 6 and 9] . . . was amplified and defined in several paragraphs.” Id. The Human Rights Committee,
however, has interpreted the word “arbitrarily” in each of these provisions to mean that mere lawfulness
(under municipal law) does not, in and of itself, constitute nonarbitrary action. See infra note 159.
132
See supra Section I.A.3.
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imposes.133 Furthermore, if the State’s goals can be accomplished without
banishment (e.g., by sanctioning criminal behavior through imprisonment),
then the deprivation of the right to remain would be deemed arbitrary since it
would not be necessary. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a situation in which
banishment would not be arbitrary.134
Given this interpretation, mere procedural due process is not enough to
make any banishment nonarbitrary, and banishment done merely in
accordance with municipal law may still be arbitrary. There is a difference
between being lawful, on the one hand, and being reasonable, necessary,
proportionate, and justifiable—i.e., not arbitrary—on the other. States parties
have an interest in enforcing their municipal laws, including their immigration
laws, but they are prohibited from enforcing laws that violate the ICCPR.135
4.

Preparatory Works

An examination of the preparatory works leading to the adoption of the
ICCPR reveals quite a bit about what the negotiating States meant by
“arbitrarily” in Article 12.4 and confirms the broad interpretation described
above.
The text of what would become Article 12 was negotiated over the
course of more than a decade, culminating in the adoption of the final text in
1959. During the drafting process, whenever a negotiating State proposed
allowing States to restrict the right of entry for reasons of national security,
public order, public health, and the like, these proposals were rejected by the
other negotiating States. For example, during the drafting conferences of the
Commission on Human Rights in 1949, both Lebanon and France proposed
language that would permit States to deprive someone of the right to enter
133

For discussions of the need for proportionality in the context of immigration enforcement, see
generally Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
415 (2012); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009).
134
Some have argued that allowing undocumented noncitizens to remain in a country imposes undue
costs on society, e.g., administrative costs, medical costs, costs associated with increased job competition.
See, e.g., Christopher Rugaber, Trump’s Harsh Message to Immigrants Could Drag on Economy, ASSOC.
PRESS (Sept. 6, 2017) https://www.apnews.com/70d54a71362e4d90ad1959c8d33266ac (making this
argument with regard to DACA recipients in the United States). Some may argue that the desire to rid the
country of such costs justifies their deportation. However, the societal costs imposed by the average
undocumented person would not seem to be considerably more than those imposed by the average citizen,
and any argument that asserts that a desire to rid a country of these costs renders deportation of undocumented
noncitizens nonarbitrary (as that term is used in ICCPR Article 12.4) would necessarily lead to the absurd
conclusion that a State could also banish any citizen unless they proved themselves to be a net asset to the
country.
135
See sources cited supra note 32 (discussing the relationship between international law and state
sovereignty).
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their country for “reasons of security or in the general interest.”136 Several
negotiating States declared those reasons to be too permissive. Some
negotiating States argued that the right to enter one’s own country was a
“fundamental” human right.137 Consequently, the negotiating States decided
to isolate the articulation of the right to enter one’s country from the
articulation of the other movement rights and placed only the most limited
restrictions on the exercise of the right to enter.138
A similar discussion with similar results occurred at the General
Assembly in the days before it adopted the final text. Most of those
discussions focused on a series of three draft proposals made jointly by
Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines, the so-called “FivePower” Amendments.139 The Original Five-Power Amendment proposed that
the right to enter one’s country could be restricted on the basis of “law” that
was “necessary to protect national security, [public safety,] health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others. . ..”140 The First Revised Five-Power
Amendment proposed a similar set of exceptions.141 These proposals were met
with widespread objection because most States believed that the right to enter
one’s country should not be subject to such permissive exceptions.142 and very

136

U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Draft Int’l Covenant on Hum. Rts., Lebanon:
Amends. to Art. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/215/Rev.1 (May 26, 1949); U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on
Hum. Rts., Draft Int’l Covenant on Hum. Rts., France: Amend. to the Lebanese Proposal, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/275 (May 31, 1949).
137
U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Fifth Sess., 106th mtg. at 5–9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.106 (May 31, 1949).
138
Id. at 5–9, 10–11.
139
Draft Int’l Covenants on Hum. Rts., Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines: Amends.
to Art. 12 of the Draft Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.812 (Nov. 12, 1959) [hereinafter
Original Five-Power Amendment]; Draft Int’l Covenants on Hum. Rts., Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and
the Philippines: Revised Amends. to Art. 12 of the Draft Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts., U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/L.812/Rev.1 (Nov. 13, 1959) [hereinafter First Revised Five-Power Amendment]; Draft Int’l
Covenants on Hum. Rts., Argentina, Belgium, Iran, Italy, and the Philippines: Revised Amends. to Art. 12
of the Draft Covenant on Civ. and Pol. Rts., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.812/Rev.2 (Nov. 16, 1959) [hereinafter
Second Revised Five-Power Amendment].
140
Original Five-Power Amendment, supra note 139, art. 12.3.
141
See First Revised Five-Power Amendment, supra note 139.
142
See, e.g., ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 47, ¶ 23 (Summary Statement of the United
Kingdom); ICCPR Preparatory Works, SR.957, supra note 41 (Summary Statement of Ireland,), ¶¶ 3, 38; id.
¶ 12 (Summary Statement of India); id. ¶ 14 (Summary Statement of Lebanon); id. ¶ 16 (Summary Statement
of Afghanistan); id. ¶ 19 (Summary Statement of the United Kingdom); id. ¶ 24 (Summary Statement of
Saudi Arabia); id. ¶ 32 (Summary Statement of Morocco).
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few States voiced support for those exceptions,143 As a result, these proposals
were roundly rejected.144
Nevertheless, some States wanted to permit “exiling” people, and the
discussions that directly led to the decision to insert the word “arbitrarily”
occurred in this context.145 Some States thought it was appropriate to allow
“lawful exile,”146 while others considered exile to be an antiquated practice
and never appropriate regardless of the circumstances.147 Many of the States
that objected to permitting “lawful exile” also objected to any exceptions at
all to the right to enter one’s own country.148

143

Even the members of the Five-Power group of States did not actively support these exceptions. Their
proposals were attempts to capture and synthesize the apparent will of the General Assembly based on views
most recently expressed by the negotiating States. As that will became clearer, the Five-Power amendments
evolved in response.
144
This rejection prompted the Five-Power group of States to revise their proposal, and the next
morning they suggested a new text of Article 12, one which not only removed the authority of States to limit
the right of entry based on national security concerns, public order concerns, and the like, but which was
adopted later that day as the final text of Article 12. Second Revised Five-Power Amendment, supra note
139; ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 46, at Agenda Items, ¶ 2; U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 959th
mtg. at 251, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.959 (Nov. 17, 1959) [hereinafter ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.959]
(announcing the result of the vote adopting the Second Revised Five-Power Amendment). The Second
Revised Five-Power Amendment proposed the use of the word “arbitrarily” in Article 12.4, and much of the
debate about Article 12.4 for the rest of the day concerned the use of that word and possible alternatives.
145
See supra note 40 (providing the proposed draft that the Commission on Human Rights presented
to the General Assembly for its consideration prior to the General Assembly’s discussion and adoption of the
final version of Article 12.) Note that that draft provided that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary exile”
and that otherwise “anyone shall be free to enter his own country.” Draft Int’l Covenants on Hum. Rts., U.N.
Doc. A/4299, ¶ 3 (Dec. 3, 1959).
146
E.g., ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 4 (Summary Statement of Portugal); id. ¶
12 (Summary Statement of India); id. ¶ 26 (Summary Statement of Italy); id. ¶ 34 (Summary Statement of
the United Kingdom); id. ¶ 38 (Summary Statement of Ireland); ICCPR Preparatory Works, SR.958, supra
note 46, ¶ 4 (Summary Statement of Ireland), id. ¶ 21 (Summary Statement of Italy); ICCPR Preparatory
Works SR.959, supra note 144, ¶ 32 (Summary Statement of the United States).
147
See, e.g., ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 47, ¶ 31 (Summary Statement of El
Salvador); ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 7 (Summary Statement of Yugoslavia); id. ¶
8 (Summary Statement of Greece); ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 46, ¶ 2 (Summary
Statement of Argentina); id. ¶ 10 (Summary Statement of Philippines). At least ten additional States spoke
out against the inclusion of any language that permitted “lawful exile” or nonarbitrary deprivation of one’s
right to enter his or her own country. Those countries were Spain, El Salvador, Panama, Ethiopia, Cuba,
Honduras, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 25; ICCPR Preparatory Works
SR.959, supra note 144, ¶¶ 28–30, 33–34, 36–37. See also ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note
47, ¶ 15 (Summary Statement of the Philippines stating, “Exile was no longer a commonly imposed
punishment, perhaps because it laid upon other counties the duty of taking in the exile persons”). Two
negotiating States, the United Kingdom and Ecuador, expressed the view that being “exiled” was something
that could only happen to citizens. ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶¶ 34, 35 (“A citizen
was exiled; a foreigner was expelled.”). This observation lends some support to the argument that the
negotiating States were assuming that the Article 12.4 right to enter was a right held only by citizens.
148
See sources cited supra notes 142–144.
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The decision to insert the word “arbitrarily” in the final text of Article
12.4 was largely a compromise between these two groups.149 The negotiating
States understood and acknowledged that a rule prohibiting “arbitrary”
deprivation of a right was quite ambiguous with regard to what kind of
deprivation would be permitted,150 but it was clearly intended by the
negotiating States to overwhelmingly restrict banishment.151 The vote to
approve inserting the word “arbitrarily” was 29 to 20 with 20 abstentions.152
From the tone of the debate and State comments made after the vote, we know
that many of the countries that abstained were against inserting “arbitrarily”
or any exception at all into Article 12.4 but were abstaining out of respect for
those countries that wanted some kind of exception.153
In sum, during the entire drafting process, the articulation of the right
to enter one’s own country in Article 12 was almost always deliberately
isolated from the other Article 12 movement rights (e.g., the right of internal
movement, the right to leave)154 in order to make the entry right more absolute.
The negotiating States did not want the right to enter one’s own country to be
restricted even when such restrictions might be “necessary to protect national
security, the general interest, public order (ordre public), public health or
morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.” This strongly suggests that the
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be arbitrary even if
the State were to deem such deprivation “necessary” to protect such
concerns.155 Therefore, “arbitrarily” must have a particularly broad meaning,
one that captures nearly all State actions that prevent a person from entering
149

See ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 46, ¶ 21 (Summary Statement of Italy)
(articulating the compromise of the use of the word “arbitrarily”); id. ¶ 29 (Summary Statement of Argentina)
(articulating the same).
150
See, e.g., ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.957, supra note 41, ¶ 7 (Summary Statement of
Yugoslavia); ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.958, supra note 46, ¶ 21 (Summary Statement of Italy).
151
There was no attempt to define the word “arbitrarily,” and no State articulated its own understanding
of what “arbitrarily” meant in the context of Article 12.4. U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., 954–59th mtgs., U.N.
Docs. A/C.3/SR.954–A/C.3/SR.959 (1959). During the debates that led to the decision to insert the word
“arbitrarily” in Article 12.4, there was no explicit discussion about whether noncitizens could be arbitrarily,
lawfully, or otherwise exiled or expelled. This omission is understandable considering ICCPR Article 13
addresses the deportation processes applicable to aliens.
152
ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.959, supra note 144, ¶ 27.
153
See, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (Summary Statement of Cuba) (voicing its objection to any restrictions on the right
to enter one’s own country but identifying itself as a State that abstained); id. ¶ 30 (Summary Statement of
Honduras) (same); id. ¶ 37 (Summary Statement of Colombia) (same).
154
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 12.
155
The use of the word “necessary” in Article 12.3 and its omission in Article 12.4’s right of entry raise
problematic interpretation issues. If an action is “necessary,” how can it also be “arbitrary”? It is fairly clear
that the negotiating States were worried that States parties might abuse the discretion that Article 12.3 grants.
They feared States parties might apply Article 12.3 exceptions too liberally and might restrict the right of
entry in ways that are not “necessary” at all. Otherwise, an analysis and interpretation of the word “necessary”
in Article 12.3 is beyond the scope of this Article.
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their own country. Certainly, concerns like national security may be
considered when determining whether or not a deprivation is arbitrary, but
such concerns are not necessarily sufficient to justify such deprivation.
Admittedly, this still leaves us to wonder what would constitute a nonarbitrary
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country, but such situations must
be exceedingly rare.
B.

Jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee

Reflecting the conclusions suggested by the customary rules of treaty
interpretation, including an analysis of the preparatory works, the Human
Rights Committee has repeatedly asserted, in interpreting and applying the
word “arbitrarily” in Article 12.4, that there are “few, if any, circumstances in
which deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be
reasonable.”156 In the jurisprudence of the Committee, reasonableness is one
of the hallmarks of non-arbitrariness. In its general comments and recent cases
addressing Article 12.4, the Committee has reiterated that any denial of entry
to one’s country must be “reasonable in the particular circumstances.” 157 Of
course, this raises the question of what is “reasonable.”
In Budlakoti, the Human Rights Committee listed other hallmarks of
arbitrariness. It stated, “The notion of ‘arbitrariness’ includes elements of
inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law, as
well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality.”158 Those
are quite a few elements, but the following conclusions can be made about the
Human Rights Committee’s interpretation on arbitrariness as used in Article
12.4. First, a decision to deny someone the right to enter their own country (or
to banish someone) is one that must be made only after balancing all the
interests of, and costs and benefits to, both the State and the individual in
question. Second, to be nonarbitrary, denial of entry (or banishment) must be
necessary; that is, there must not be any lesser means to adequately
accomplish the State party’s fundamental goal, a means that would ensure the
State’s interests are adequately met without imposing upon someone the
extraordinary harsh consequences of banishment from their own country.159
156

See, e.g., CCPR General Comment No. 27, supra note 3, ¶ 21; CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶
9.4; CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.6; CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.6.
157
CCPR General Comment 27, supra note 3, ¶ 21; CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.6; CCPR
Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.6.
158
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.4.
159
The ICCPR prohibits States parties from engaging in three other “arbitrary” behaviors. Article 6.1
of the ICCPR provides, “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life.” ICCPR, supra note 1. Article 9.1
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Examining how the Human Rights Committee has applied this
analytical framework in the context of attempts to deport criminal noncitizens
and how the Committee’s jurisprudence suggests it would apply the
framework in the context of a noncitizen’s illegal entry or unlawful presence
demonstrates just how rare the Committee believes nonarbitrary banishments
to be.
1.

Criminal Activity

In its three most recent Article 12.4 cases, Budlakoti, Nystrom, and
Warsame, the Human Rights Committee concluded that expulsion would
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter one’s country even
though each person facing deportation had engaged in extensive criminal
activity.160 Mr. Budlakoti, who was born in Canada and lived there all his life,
had, before turning twenty-two, been convicted of breaking and entering,
trafficking a firearm, possession of an illegal weapon, and trafficking in
cocaine, among other charges.161 He had been sentenced to an aggregate of
provides, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” Id. Article 17.1 provides, “No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation.” Id. In each case, the Human Rights Committee has interpreted
“arbitrary” in a similar fashion as it interprets “arbitrary” in the context of Article 12.4, that is to say, as a
restriction narrower than would be required by an obligation to merely act lawfully or with articulable reason.
See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 36 on Article 6: Right to Life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, ¶
12 (Oct. 30, 2018) (“A deprivation of life may, nevertheless, be authorized by domestic law and still be
arbitrary. The notion of “arbitrariness” is not to be fully equated with “against the law,” but must be
interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability, and due
process of law as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality.”); Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment 8 on Article 9: Right to Liberty and Security of Persons, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶ 4 (1994) (requiring that preventative detention must be both “based on grounds and
procedures established by law” and “not be arbitrary”); Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment 16 on Article
17 (Right to Privacy): The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection
of Honour and Reputation, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶ 4 (1994) (originally from 23rd Sess., Apr. 8,
1988) (interpreting “arbitrary interference” in the context of Article 17 in such a way that even interference
done pursuant to municipal law may be arbitrary. In order to refrain from an arbitrary decision, a State’s
decision must be “in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives” of the ICCPR and “reasonable in
the particular circumstances”); CCPR A.B., supra note 122, at ¶ 8.7 (“[T]he notion of arbitrariness [in the
context of Article 17] includes elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process
of law, as well as elements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality. The Committee also recalls that
the relevant criteria for assessing whether or not the specific interference with family life can be objectively
justified must be considered in the light, on the one hand, of the significance of the State party’s reasons for
the removal of the person concerned and, on the other hand, of the degree of hardship the family and its
members would encounter as a consequence of such removal.”); CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.4
(reiterating the same).
160
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.4; CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.6; CCPR Warsame, supra
note 59, ¶ 8.6.
161
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶¶ 2.5, 4.5, 4.16.
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four years in jail.162 Mr. Nystrom, a Swedish citizen who lived in Australia
since he was an infant, had been convicted of a large number of crimes since
he was ten years old, including aggravated rape (of a child of ten when Mr.
Nystrom was sixteen), arson, armed robbery, burglary, theft, and drug
possession.163 He had been sentenced to an aggregate of more than twenty
years in prison.164 Mr. Warsame, a Somali man who lived in Canada since he
was four years old, began his life of crime at age fifteen.165 Among his
convictions were assault of a 60-year-old woman, multiple incidents of theft
and robbery (occasionally with violence, including stabbing a store clerk with
a screwdriver during one robbery), possession of crack cocaine, and assaulting
a fellow inmate.166 He had been sentenced to an aggregate of at least three
years in jail.167 In each case, the Human Rights Committee concluded that,
despite their extensive criminality, expulsion would amount to an arbitrary
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country, and thus each State party
was prohibited under the terms of Article 12.4 from deporting these men.168
In reaching these conclusions, the Human Rights Committee balanced
the interests of the State against the harshness of banishment. In none of these
cases did the Committee provide a particularly extensive explanation of why
it concluded that banishment would be arbitrary. However, in each case,
before stating its conclusion, the Committee reiterated its assertion that “there
are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s
own country could be reasonable.”169 Where it did explain its conclusions
162

Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.7. See also supra notes 90–104 and accompanying text (concluding that Canada was
Mr. Budlakoti’s own country).
163
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶¶ 2.3, 2.5, 3.10, 4.6.
164
Id. ¶¶ 1.1–2.8. See also supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text (concluding that Australia was
Mr. Nystrom’s own country).
165
CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶¶ 2.2., 8.10.
166
Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 4.2, 4.3, 5.10, 8.9.
167
Id. ¶¶ 2.3, 2.4, 4.3, 5.4, 5.10. See also supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text (concluding that
Canada was Mr. Warsame’s own country).
168
Despite the Human Rights Committee’s conclusions, Australia deported Mr. Nystrom and Canada
deported Mr. Warsame. Remedy Australia, Follow-up Report on Violations by Australia of ICERD, ICCPR
& CAT in Individual Communications (1994–2014), at 32–34 (2014) (describing Nystrom’s deportation)
https://remedy.org.au/reports/2014_Follow-Up_Report_to_treaty_bodies.pdf. Canada deported Mr.
Warsame and put him on a set of flights to Somalia, but after disembarking in transit in Amsterdam, he
requested asylum from the Netherlands, claiming he would be subject to persecution in Somalia. In a
Kafkaesque turn of events, however, the Dutch refused to grant him asylum since they deemed him to be
Canadian (not Somali) and not subject to asylum-qualifying persecution in Canada. Andrew Stobo
Sniderman, Jama Warsame is a Citizen of Nowhere, Maclean’s (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.macleans.ca/n
ews/canada/jame-warsame-is-a-citizen-of-nowhere/.
169
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.6; CCPR Warsame, supra note 59, ¶ 8.6; CCPR Budlakoti, supra
note 58, ¶ 9.4; see also CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, at 20, ¶ 8 (dissenting opinion of Elizabeth Evatt and
Cecilia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José Aguilar Urbina) (declaring—after concluding, unlike
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more particularly, the Committee emphasized whether or not the crimes were
of a violent nature;170 the extent to which the crimes were motivated by or
resulted from drug or alcohol addiction and, if so, the length of time of
sobriety;171 and the length of time between the crimes, on the one hand, and
the deportation orders, on the other.172 Nevertheless, it is evident that even the
commission of violent crimes did not, in and of itself, justify banishment.
Both Mr. Warsame and Mr. Nystrom had committed quite violent crimes,
including rape, arson, and assault,173 yet the Human Rights Committee
concluded that deporting them would be arbitrary.
Indeed, States do not exile their own citizens who behave in a similar
fashion.174 States investigate, arrest, prosecute, punish, and attempt to
rehabilitate citizens.175 As undesirable as one’s crimes may be, one’s identity
as a noncitizen does not make the State’s criminal justice system any less able
to address the criminal activity in the same way.176 Further still, banishing
such a person imposes that person’s criminal propensity on another country
and on another group of people. In fact, such a deportation not only shifts
the majority in Stewart, that Canada was Mr. Stewart’s “own country” and consequently reaching the issue
of arbitrariness—that “deportation could be considered arbitrary if the grounds relied on to deprive him of
his right to enter and remain in the country were, in the circumstance, unreasonable, when weighed against
the circumstances which make that country his ‘own country’); id. at 23 (dissenting opinion of
Prafullachandra Bhagwati) (“Where an action taken by the State party against a person is excessive or
disproportionate to the harm sought to be prevented, it would be unreasonable and arbitrary.”).
170
CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.4.
171
Id.; CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.6; see also CCPR Stewart, supra note 3, at 23 (dissenting
opinion of Prafullachandra Bhagwati) (noting that Mr. Nystrom “has succeeded in controlling his alcohol
abuse”).
172
CCPR Nystrom, supra note 59, ¶ 7.6; CCPR Budlakoti, supra note 58, ¶ 9.4.
173
Supra notes 163–167 and accompanying text.
174
The author knows of no State in the twenty-first century that practices extraterritorial je jure exile
of its undesirable citizens. Regrettably, de facto exile is quite common, often taking the form of flight from
persecution or civil unrest.
175
Allowing States to banish people based on a history of criminal convictions would give States great
latitude to banish people, since States can decide for themselves what to criminalize and could criminalize
(and have criminalized) relatively innocuous things. Banishment premised on such criminal activity seems
neither necessary to achieve any legitimate State goal nor a proportionate response to any such threat of
continued criminal behavior. Furthermore, the worse the crime, the less justified it would be to impose such
criminality on another country.
176
Several dissenting Committee members in the now-discredited Stewart opinion suggested that a
State’s criminal justice system should always be expected to address any criminal recidivism. See CCPR
Stewart, supra note 3, at 20, ¶ 9 (dissenting opinion of Elizabeth Evatt and Ceclia Medina Quiroga, co-signed
by Francisco José Aguilar Urbin) (“It must be doubted whether the commission of criminal offences alone
could justify the expulsion of a person from his own country…”); id. at 23 (dissenting opinion of
Prafullachandra Bhagwati) (suggesting that the State’s goal “to protect society from… criminal propensity”
can be “achieved by taking lesser action than expulsion or deportation,” and asserting that if Mr. Stewart
were to commit any more offenses, “he can be adequately punished and imprisoned for it… This is the kind
of action which would be taken against a national in order to protect the society, and qua national, it would
be regarded as adequate. I do not see why it should not be regarded as adequate qua a person who is not a
national…”).
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some threat of criminality from one group of people to another, but it may
very well shift that threat from a group of people who make up the society in
which the noncitizen became a criminal to a group who make up a society that
played little or no role in that development.177
2.

Unlawful Entry and Unlawful Presence

In each of the Human Rights Committee Article 12.4 decisions
discussed above, the noncitizen subject to potential deportation entered the
country lawfully (or was born in the country to parents who entered lawfully)
and faced visa revocation only upon the State’s decision to deport. Each
noncitizen had been convicted of crimes, and, in some instances, multiple
serious crimes. The State’s interest in each of these matters was to eliminate
from its territory the criminal threat posed by the noncitizen. But what if the
deportee had not been convicted of a crime? Can a person be deported from
their own country simply because their entry or presence is unlawful under
municipal immigration law? Can the deportation of a person be nonarbitrary
simply because that person is present in a country unlawfully?
The Human Rights Committee has not yet addressed the question of
whether a State’s decision to deport a noncitizen from their own country can
be nonarbitrary if the only reason the State wants to deport the noncitizen is
that the noncitizen unlawfully entered the territory of the State and/or resides
in the territory of the State in violation of its municipal immigration laws.178
Although the Committee has not answered this question in the context of an
177
See ICCPR Preparatory Works SR.956, supra note 47, ¶ 15 (Summary Statement of the Philippines)
(suggesting that exile was no longer a commonly imposed punishment “because it laid upon other countries
the duty of taking in the exiled persons”). However, in many cases, a banished person quickly deteriorates
mentally and physically after he is deported to a country with which he has no substantial connection, whose
language he cannot speak, whose culture is unfamiliar, and in which he has few if any familial or social
resources. As a result, he may become less capable of engaging in successful criminality. But this possible
“bright side” of banishment—the mental and physical deterioration of someone who has likely already served
his criminal sentences—hardly seems just. In other cases, a lack of resources in a new country may make a
banished person more desperate for self-preservation and more inclined to commit crimes. See also, supra
notes 68–78, 163–164 and accompanying text (discussing Nystrom v. Australia); REMEDY AUSTRALIA, supra
note 168, at 33 (reporting that despite the Human Rights Committee’s conclusion in Nystrom v. Australia,
Australia deported Mr. Nystrom to Sweden where he resumed drinking and has “variously been homeless,
in homeless shelters, in prison and in psychiatric care”); Chris Gelardi, The Tragic Story of Jimmy Aldaoud,
Deported from the Streets of Detroit to His Death in Iraq, THE INTERCEPT (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/08/08/ice-deportation-iraq-jimmy-aldaoud/ (describing the deportation of a
noncitizen American to Iraq and his death two months later).
178
The term “criminality” as used in this Article does not include any “criminality” resulting only from
unlawful entry into or unlawful presence in the territory of a State. See G.A. Res. 71/1, ¶ 33, New York
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Sept. 19, 2016) (declaring that the States of the United Nations will
“consider reviewing policies that criminalize cross-border movements”).

SPRING 2022

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN

349

Article 12.4 claim, it has addressed the issue in the context of claims under
ICCPR Articles 17 and 23, which address the protection of the family. The
Committee’s analysis there strongly suggests that the Committee would insist
that any such deportation would be arbitrary and thus violate Article 12.4.
In Winata and Li v. Australia,179 the Human Rights Committee
considered a claim by two Indonesian citizens, a man and a woman, who were
facing deportation from Australia.180 Both had lawfully entered Australia on
short-term visas but had long overstayed their visas.181 They met in Australia,
entered into a “de facto relationship akin to marriage,” and had a son they
named Barry.182 Barry appears to have been born while each of his parents
was unlawfully residing in Australia.183 When Barry turned ten, he became an
Australian citizen.184 A day later, his parents applied for asylum based on a
claim that they would face persecution in Indonesia on account of their
Chinese ethnicity and Christian religion.185 Australia denied their applications
and eventually issued removal orders.186 Neither the mother nor the father (nor
Barry) had engaged in any criminal conduct.187 Australia justified its
deportation orders – i.e., claimed deportation would not be arbitrary – on the
fact that Barry’s parents had been residing in Australia in violation of
Australia’s municipal immigration laws.188
Mr. Winata and Ms. Li appealed to the Human Rights Committee and
argued that if they were deported either Barry would have to live in Australia
without his parents or Barry, an Australian citizen, would be forced to move
to Indonesia, a country to which he had never been and whose language and
culture he did not know.189 They argued that their deportation would violate
Article 17 of the ICCPR in either case.190 Article 17 provides, in part, that
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his

179

Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 930/2000, Winata v. Australia, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (July 26, 2001) [hereinafter CCPR Winata].
180
Indonesia may have formally withdrawn their citizenship, but Australia assumed that Indonesia
would readily re-recognize their Indonesian citizenship if they moved back to Indonesia and applied for it.
Id. ¶ 2.4.
181
Id. ¶ 2.1.
182
Id.
183
Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.2.
184
Id. ¶ 2.2.
185
Id.
186
Id. ¶¶ 2.2–2.6, 4.11.
187
This assertion is based on the fact that there is no mention in the Human Rights Committee
communication of any (non-immigration-related) criminal activity. Id.
188
Id. ¶ 4.11.
189
Id. ¶ 3.4.
190
Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.1–3.6.
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privacy, family, [or] home . . ..”191 Relevant to our analysis, the Human Rights
Committee interpreted “arbitrarily” as it is used in the context of Article 17
the same way it interprets “arbitrarily” as it is used in the context of Article
12.4.192 After concluding that such deportations would constitute
“interference” with the family, the Committee stated:
[T]here is significant scope for States parties to enforce their
immigration policy and to require departure of unlawfully
present persons. That discretion is, however, not unlimited and
may come to be exercised arbitrarily in certain circumstances. In
the present case, both [parents] have been in Australia for over
fourteen years. [Their] son has grown in Australia from his birth
[thirteen] years ago, attending Australian schools as an ordinary
child would and developing the social relationships inherent in
that. In view of this duration of time, it is incumbent on the State
party to demonstrate additional factors justifying the removal of
both parents that go beyond a simple enforcement of its
immigration law in order to avoid a characterization of
arbitrariness. In the particular circumstances, therefore, the
Committee considers that the removal by the State party of the
[parents] would constitute, if implemented, arbitrary interference
with the family. . .193
If the Human Rights Committee were to apply its interpretation of
“arbitrarily” under Article 17 to Article 12.4, a State party would be prohibited
from deporting someone from their own country for the mere reason that that

191

Relatedly, Mr. Winata and Ms. Li also argued that their deportation would violate (i) Article 23.1
of the ICCPR, which reads, “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State;” and (ii) Article 24.1 of the ICCPR, which reads, “Every child shall
have … the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his
family, society and the State.” ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 23.1, 24.1.
192
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
193
CCPR Winata, supra note 179, ¶ 7.3. Four Human Rights Committee members issued a joint
dissenting opinion protesting this interpretation. Id. at 15, ¶¶ 4, 5 (dissenting opinion of Prafullachandra
Natwarlal Bhagwati, Tawfik Khalil, David Kretzmer and Max Yalden) (first asserting, after rejecting that
there was any “family interference” at all under the terms of Article 17.1, that a mere desire to enforce State
immigration laws is alone an appropriate, nonarbitrary justification for interfering with a family at least in
the circumstances where family unity can be maintained by having the child move to Indonesia with his
Indonesian parents; and second, noting that the implication of the majority’s holding is that undocumented
immigrants can create a right to stay in their host countries by having and raising children there). Australia
rejected the Human Rights Committee’s views but did not deport Mr. Winata and Ms. Li. See REMEDY
AUSTRALIA, supra note 168, at 44.
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person’s entry into or presence in the territory of that country violated the
State’s municipal immigration laws.194
Three years later, the Human Rights Committee had the opportunity to
apply the Winata rule in a case involving a Fijian citizen facing deportation
from New Zealand. Sahid v. New Zealand195 concerned a 57-year-old Fijian
man, Mohammad Sahid, who had been living in New Zealand for fifteen years
in violation of its municipal immigration law.196 He had arrived lawfully on a
temporary visa that had long since expired.197 He had no criminal record and
appeared to be a law-abiding, family man.198 His daughter, a lawful resident,
and her four-year-old son, a citizen, also lived in New Zealand.199 The three
appeared to be very close.200 Mr. Sahid claimed that his daughter suffered
from physical and emotional disabilities and that he was the primary caregiver
for the entire family.201 The only justification New Zealand gave for deporting
Mr. Sahid was to enforce its immigration law.202 Like Mr. Winata and Ms. Li
above, Mr. Sahid argued, in part, that his deportation would violate New
Zealand’s ICCPR obligation to protect families.203
Curiously, however, unlike Mr. Winata and Ms. Li, Mr. Sahid did not
make an Article 17 claim.204 Instead, he alleged that New Zealand was
violating Article 23.1, which states, “The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and
the State.”205 Nevertheless, New Zealand defended itself against a
hypothetical Article 17 claim,206 and the Human Rights Committee, without
referring to Article 17, cited to Winata in deciding that New Zealand did not
violate its obligations under Article 23 (or any other ICCPR obligation):
194

See also sources cited supra note 159 (describing how the Human Rights Committee has interpreted
the word “arbitrarily” in other provisions of the ICCPR).
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Hum. Rts. Comm., Adoption of Views on Communication No. 893/1999, Sahid v. New Zealand,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/893/1999 (Apr. 11, 2003) [hereinafter CCPR Sahid].
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Id. ¶¶ 1, 2.1.
197
Id. ¶ 2.1. Mr. Sahid never hid from New Zealand’s immigration authorities. After his New Zealand
visa expired, he repeatedly applied for further visas, was rejected each time, and appealed each decision,
always without success. This process of applying and appealing lasted many years until he finally ran out of
domestic options and was deported. Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.3.
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Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.1, 4.13.
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CCPR Sahid, supra note 195, ¶¶ 4.13–4.22.
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[I]n extraordinary circumstances, a State party must demonstrate
factors justifying the removal of persons within its jurisdiction
that go beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in
order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness. In Winata, the
extraordinary circumstance was the State party’s intention to
remove the parents of a minor, born in the State party, who had
become a naturalized citizen after the required [ten] years
residence in that country. In the present case, [Mr. Sahid’s]
removal has left his grandson with his mother and her husband
in New Zealand. As a result, in the absence of exceptional
factors, such as those noted in Winata, the Committee finds that
the State party’s removal of [Mr. Sahid] was not contrary to his
right under article 23, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.207
The significance of this statement for the interpretation of Article 17 is
debatable. The Human Rights Committee was not asked to adjudge a claim
based on Article 17. Consequently, the Committee did not make any formal
conclusions as to whether there was “interference with the family” or, if so,
whether any such interference was “arbitrary.” Nor is it clear what the
Committee meant by the phrase “extraordinary circumstances.” As stated in
Sahid, it is only in “extraordinary circumstances” that a State party must
“demonstrate factors justifying the removal of persons within its jurisdiction
that go beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to avoid
a characterization of arbitrariness.”208 One wonders what is “extraordinary”
about a family unit that contains an immigrant mother, an immigrant father,
and a 13-year-old child citizen born and raised in his parents’ host country as
in Winata. Perhaps it was “extraordinary” only in that the family unit had
lived in Australia for over a decade and the child was a citizen, whereas in
most deportation cases, the noncitizen being deported does not have such a
resonate family (or “own country”) claim to remaining. It is clear, however,
that the Human Rights Committee was not particularly inclined to maintain
the cohesion of a family unit that included Mr. Sahid. His continued presence
207

Id. ¶ 8.2.
Id. ¶ 8.2. The use of the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” may have been adopted from the
Winata dissent’s reference to “exceptional cases” three years earlier. CCPR Winata, supra note 179, at 15, ¶
4 (dissenting opinion of Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati, Tawfik Khalil, David Kretzmer and Max
Yalden) (“There may indeed be exceptional cases in which the interference with the family is so strong that
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characterize a decision requiring the family member to leave as arbitrary.”).
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close to the other members of that family was not particularly important to the
Committee. His daughter was a married, full-grown adult, and his young
grandson had parents with whom he lived.209 The need to include Mr. Sahid
in that family did not outweigh New Zealand’s interest in enforcing its
immigration laws—at least under the terms of ICCPR Article 23, an article
that only requires the State to provide some undefined level of “protection”
for families.
Neither Mr. Winata, Ms. Li, nor Mr. Sahid entered their host countries
in violation of the domestic immigration laws. Mr. Winata and Ms. Li
overstayed their visas and resided in Australia unlawfully for many years. Mr.
Sahid overstayed his New Zealand visa and then remained in the country for
a decade while under a deportation order. What if, instead, someone both
entered and resided in violation of the State’s immigration laws? The Human
Rights Committee has not yet considered such a fact pattern. However, it has
stated repeatedly that applying municipal immigration law does not, in itself,
necessarily make a State’s decision to prohibit a person from entering their
own country (or a decision to expel someone from their own country)
reasonable or nonarbitrary.210 The municipal law itself must comply with the
obligations of Article 12.4. Combined with the Winata assertion that “it is
incumbent on the State party to demonstrate additional factors … that go
beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration law in order to avoid a
characterization of arbitrariness”211 when the State interferes with one’s
privacy, family, or home, Human Rights Committee jurisprudence seems to
dictate that even a noncitizen who entered a country unlawfully and resides
there unlawfully cannot be removed if the host country has become his or her
own country unless the State can justify the removal beyond a mere desire to
enforce its municipal immigration laws. And, even then, the justification
would have to be significant enough to be deemed nonarbitrary. Recall that in
Budlakoti, Nystrom, and Warsame, the Human Rights Committee deemed it
arbitrary to deport noncitizens with long histories of criminality, including
violent criminality. Consequently, one wonders what could justify removing
anyone from his or her own country.
Such a conclusion by the Human Rights Committee would be correct.
After all, it is begging the question to argue that the justification for banishing
209

CCPR Winata, supra note 179, ¶ 7.3 (emphasis added).
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someone from their own country is that they have not been given permission
to remain in the country. Denial of permission itself hardly qualifies as a
reason for denial of permission.212 That reasoning is circular. The real question
is whether withholding (or revoking) permission is allowed under the ICCPR.
Other explanations are necessary to justify the banishment, to make it
nonarbitrary. In other words, banishing someone from their own country
based solely on a desire to enforce municipal law, without more, is unjustified
and unreasonable. It is, in a word, arbitrary. Quite simply, the ICCPR limits a
country’s ability to enact or enforce certain immigration laws.213
One might argue that banishment under these circumstances generally
fosters respect for law and governance by the rule of law, but the ICCPR is
also law,214 and respect for it requires that no one be banished without
extremely good reason. And, indeed, it is difficult to imagine what could
constitute good reason for banishing anyone from their own county.
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “OWN COUNTRY” AND
“ARBITRARILY”

At this point, some might wonder if there is an interpretive relationship
between the terms “own country,” on the one hand, and “arbitrarily,” on the
other. Might it be the case that the interpretation of one depends on the
interpretation of the other? For example, some might argue that a country can
be someone’s own to a large or a small extent, and if a country is someone’s
own to a small extent, then it is more likely that any expulsion would be
nonarbitrary. Or, conversely, if a country is someone’s own to a large extent,
then it is more likely that any expulsion would be arbitrary. However,
customary rules of treaty interpretation do not seem to support such an
interpretation.
As observed above, the text and context of “own country” strongly
suggests that a country is or is not one’s own. This is a binary determination.
And there is no textual or contextual support for the argument that what would
constitute an “arbitrary” expulsion depends on the strength of the relationship
one has with their own country. Indeed, it may be assumed that for a country
to be “one’s own,” the strength of the relationship is great, at least great
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Such argumentation recalls the parent who insists to their child that the child is not allowed to do
something “because I say you can’t.” Even children aren’t fooled by the tautology.
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See also ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 13 (providing due process rights to aliens facing deportation
proceedings).
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See supra note 32 (discussing the relationship between international law and state sovereignty).
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enough that there is no room to treat those with less strong relationships worse
than those with stronger relationships.
Further, none of the States that negotiated and adopted the language of
Article 12.4 ever suggested that someone who had stronger connections to
their own country had greater rights to remain than someone who had
relatively weaker connections to their own country.215 The discussions that led
to their decision to insert the word “arbitrarily” into the text of Article 12.4
did not include any suggestion that the strength of one’s relationship to their
own country affected the determination of whether any expulsion was
arbitrary. Granted, as noted above, there were a handful of States that
advocated (unsuccessfully) that Article 12.4 rights should be limited to
citizens, but even their positions were not expressly couched in terms of the
strength of the relationship between citizens and their countries of
citizenship.216
Additionally, the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation and
application of Article 12.4, as presented above, jibe with the conclusion that
the analysis of “own country” and “arbitrarily” are two independent analyses.
The Committee has always determined whether a country is a person’s own
country, answering either in the affirmative or the negative. If the answer is
affirmative, the Committee has then analyzed whether an expulsion of that
person would be arbitrary, without reconsidering the strength of that person’s
connection to the country. Based on the customary rules of treaty
interpretation, the Human Rights Committee’s analytical process is correct.
It is certainly true that if someone has limited, weak, or superficial
connections to a country, that country is less likely to be their “own country.”
But as soon as a country crosses the threshold to become one’s own, that
person almost always, if not always, has the right to remain there.217
CONCLUSION
Article 12.4 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country.” This article demonstrates that
Article 12.4 is broad enough that it prohibits States parties from deporting
noncitizens of a country if the noncitizens have developed extensive enough
personal attachments to the country. Such attachments might include familial,
cultural, social, linguistic, educational, and professional attachments. These
215
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“noncitizen compatriots” have the right to remain and live in the country.
Article 12.4 provides one exception. A State party can deport such a person if
the deportation is “nonarbitrary.” However, this article also demonstrates that
that the word “arbitrary,” as it is used in Article 12.4, is so broad that cases of
nonarbitrary deportation of people from their own countries are extremely
rare. Indeed, Article 12.4 prohibits States parties from deporting noncitizen
compatriots even if they entered the country in violation of municipal
immigration laws or continue to reside in the country in violation of those
laws. Article 12.4 even prohibits States parties from deporting these
noncitizens based on their criminal activity. Quite simply, people cannot be
banished from their home countries.
Just how deep and broad a noncitizen’s ties to a country must be in
order for that country to be their “own country” is debatable.218 Nevertheless,
there is no doubt that the ICCPR bestows a very valuable right to noncitizens,
particularly lawful permanent residents, long-term refugees, Dreamers and
other long-term undocumented residents, and people born in countries without
birthright citizenship. The ICCPR deems them to be home.
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Some may consider that if a noncitizen has extensive enough ties with another country (perhaps
their country of citizenship, but not necessarily), they may not be as likely to be able to claim their host state
as their “own country.” But there is nothing in the text of Article 12.4 limiting persons to one “own country,”
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